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I. COURTS, JUDGES AND ATORNEYS
A. Jurisdiction of the Courts
During the survey period a jurisdictional question arose in Flor-
ida which is similar to an unresolved controversy in the federal
circuit courts. These federal courts are divided on whether a district
court has jurisdiction to entertain a rule 60(b) motion to vacate a
judgment' without leave from the appellate court after the appellate
court has finished with the case. Neither rule 60(b) nor its Florida
counterpart, rule 1.540(b), specifically requires that the trial court
obtain appellate court leave.
In Florida, this matter was ruled upon by the District Court of
Appeal, First District, in a decision which conflicts with holdings in
other districts.2 The First District held that a trial court may enter-
tain a timely motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) even after the judgment has been
affirmed on appeal.
In Avant v. Waites,3 the court opined that by implication rule
1. See section XIV infra for a discussion of the grounds for a court's vacating a judgment.
2. In State v. Anderson, 157 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963), the court held that a trial
court must first obtain leave from the appellate court. See Lesperance v. Lesperance, 257 So.
2d 66 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), holding the same way but which stated that "even if the trial court
had the power . . . no error has been demonstrated in his denial of the relief sought."
(emphasis added) Id. at 68. See also Fairfax Broadcasting Co. v. Florida Airmotive, Inc., 252
So. 2d 854 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971); Rinker Materials Corp. v. Holloway Materials Corp., 175
So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
3. 295 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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1.540(b) dispensed with the need to obtain leave from the appellate
court. Two reasons were cited in support of its holding. Prior to the
adoption of rule 1.540(b), a trial court had to petition the appellate
court for a writ of coram nobis before it could proceed; now, the rule
has abolished this procedure.4 Also, section (a) of rule 1.540 specifi-
cally requires leave of the appellate court in certain instances before
a judgment can be set aside-section (b) does not contain any such
condition.5
The court further noted that a trial court is in a more favorable
position to conduct a hearing, receive evidence and pass upon the
issues relating to a determination of whether to grant the motion.,
The useless and delaying formalism of prior permission of the
appellate court accomplishes nothing, delays speedy administra-
tion of justice and tends to clog the dockets of the appellate courts
and the trial courts as well.7
In contrast to the decision in Avant, the District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, has held that a judgment of a trial court as
affirmed by a district court becomes the judgment of the district
court; thus, this judgment cannot later be considered for modifica-
tion by the trial court without the permission of the district court.
In Jefferson National Bank v. Metropolitan Dade County,8 the trial
court had ordered the defendants to remove all fill placed beyond
the bulkhead line from a public waterway. The Third District af-
firmed this decision. The defendants procrastinated, and after two
extensions for compliance with the order had been granted, they
moved in the trial court to modify the judgment. The plaintiff then
moved to cite the defendant for contempt and the motion was
granted. However, the Third District reversed the contempt finding
for lack of a finding of willful disobedience of the original order. The
Third District further held that the trial court should have regarded
the defendant's motion for modification of the judgment as null and
void as that court was without jurisdiction.' The case was remanded
for a rehearing on the contempt proceeding.
The exercise of formally obtaining leave from the appellate
4. Id. at 363.
5. Id. at 365.
6. Id. at 364.65.
7. Id. at 365.
8. 271 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
9. 285 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); see Walker v. Young, 93 Fla. 29, 111 So. 516 (1927);
Fairfax Broadcasting Co. v. Florida Airmotive, Inc., 252 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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court, as illustrated by Jefferson National, merely creates unneces-
sary complexity in the judicial process. Both Avant and Jefferson
National involved simple affirmances of issues decided by the trial
courts. Thus, by opening the judgments, the trial courts were not
acting in contravention of a mandate of the appellate courts, but
were simply rehearing matters which they had originally resolved.
Even had there been substantial appellate input, leading authori-
ties suggest that the trial court is in a better position to determine
whether some new matter warrants the vacating of a judgment.'0
The better view, therefore, appears to be that appellate leave should
not be required.
A jurisdictional problem arose in Valverde v. Klosters Rederi
A/S" involving the applicability of the Jones Act'" to an action
brought by a Spanish national seaman against a Norwegian corpo-
ration. Plaintiff's employment contract was signed in Spain and
provided that his rights were to be governed by Norwegian law. In
addition, the accident occurred on the high seas off the coast of the
Bahamas and the plaintiff's only contact with the United States was
that the ship docked here. The Third District, applying the ration-
ale of Corella v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 3 affirmed the trial
10. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2873, at 266-70
(1973).
The requirement of appellate leave thus read into Rule 60 introduces into an
attempted simplification of the practice for reopening judgments a useless and
delaying formalism. An appellate court may not know whether the requirements
for reopening a case under the rule are met until there has been a full record
developed. Such a record can only be made in the trial court. Of course the district
judge is not free to flout the decision of the appellate court so far as it goes, but
he should be free to consider whether circumstances not previously known to
either court compel a new trial. If the trial judge goes too far, and grants, in effect,
a rehearing of the appellate court's decision, the normal processes of review still
are open. To require in every case the formality of application to the appellate
court, which has no facilities for examining the merits of the claim for a new trial,
to guard against the possibility that a rare district judge may reopen a judgment
that should remain closed, seems of dubious utility.
Id. at 269-70.
11. 294 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
12. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
13. 101 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
The Corella court noted that the confusion created as to the application of the Jones Act
was occasioned by the opening words of the Act referring to "any seaman." Quoting Lauriteen
v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 592 (1953), the Third District found, "No justification for interpreting
the Jones Act to intervene between foreigners and their own law because of acts on a foreign
ship not in our waters." 101 So. 2d at 905.
Thus, recognizing the need in maritime jurisprudence to maintain workable relations with
foreign nations in deference to their laws, the court in Corella found the Jones Act inapplica-
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court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
under the Jones Act.
The legislature amended the jurisdiction of circuit courts in
landlord-tenant possession cases. Suits involving the right of posses-
sion of real property have been removed from circuit court jurisdic-
tion and have been vested in the exclusive jurisdiction of the county
courts except for actions involving title and boundaries of real prop-
erty. 4
Under the Florida Mental Health Act, judicial review of an
order of a hearing examiner regarding continued hospitalization
may be conducted by "the circuit court of the county in which the
hearing is held or by the court of original jurisdiction."'"
The Florida Administrative Procedure Act" provides for judi-
cial review of final administrative agency action in the district court
of appeal except where the supreme court may review actions as
provided by law, 7 or where the circuit courts retain their jurisdic-
tion when provided by statute in lieu of an administrative hearing,
or when rendering declaratory judgments 8 pursuant to the Florida
Declaratory Judgment Act."
An administrative agency may seek enforcement of its action
by filing a petition in the circuit court where the subject matter of
the enforcement is located. 0 Yet if a review petition is pending in
the district court of appeal at the same time an enforcement petition
is pending in the circuit court, the district court may consolidate the
actions.2'
Having repealed the certiorari jurisdiction of the district courts
of appeal over administrative agencies by the new Florida APA, the
legislature also provided that judicial review of an order of suspen-
sion or revocation of a driver's license shall be vested in the certior-
ari jurisdiction of the circuit court where the person resides. 2
ble where the only factor upon which the Act could apply was the signing of the contract in
the United States.
14. FLA. STAT. §§,26.012(2)(g), 34.011(2) (Supp. 1974).
15. FLA. STAT. § 394.457(6)(d) (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
16. For a detailed analysis of the interaction between the courts and administrative
agencies, see Levinson, The Florida Administrative Procedure Act: 1974 Revision and 1975
Amendments, 29 U. MlAMi L.REv. 617, sections 11, M & N (1975).
17. FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (Supp. 1974), as amended, Fla. Laws 1975 ch. 75-191.
18. FLA. STAT. § 120.73, added by Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-191, § 11.
19. FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (1973).
20. FLA. STAT. § 120.69(a) (Supp. 1974).
21. FLA. STAT. § 120.69(4)(b) (Supp. 1974).
22. FLA. STAT. § 322.27(6) (Supp. 1974).
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B. Court Costs
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, has adopted a
rule for the assessment of costs in comparative negligence cases. In
Spicuglia v. Green, 3 the Second District, recognizing the general
rule that costs follow the judgment,"' indicated that this principle
would be followed in comparative negligence cases where defendant
has asserted no counterclaim. However, where a counterclaim for
damages is filed
the better rule is that regardless of who ultimately ends up with
the one judgment in the case (again we discount the case wherein
one or the other is one hundred percent at fault) each party
should recover his full costs from the other. 5
Section (d) of rule 1.420 specifically provides for costs in actions
dismissed under the rule. In Stein v. Bayfront Medical Center,
Inc.," the plaintiff had sued the defendant in a prior action for
malpractice. The plaintiff took a voluntary dismissal and costs were
taxed against her for $534 in accordance with rule 1.420(d). Without
paying the costs previously taxed, the plaintiff then sued again on
the same claim. Under these circumstances the rule provides that
the court "shall make such order for the payment of costs of the
claim previously dismissed as it may deem proper" and the court
shall stay the present proceeding until the order is complied with.
Although an order must be entered for costs, the court has discretion
regarding its terms. Thus, the Second District held that the trial
court correctly applied the rule by ordering that the plaintiff's sec-
ond action be stayed until the costs of the first action were paid,
even though the plaintiff claimed she was indigent. Plaintiff had
failed to show that the order exceeded "the trial court's jurisdiction
or constituted a departure from the essential requirements of law."2
In assessing costs under rule 1.420(d), attorney's fees should not
be included within court costs.2"
Legal aid programs may now receive funding from service
charges in excess of those fixed by statute which "may be imposed
by the governing authority of the county" for filing an action.29
23. 302 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
24. See Foley v. Peckham, 256 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
25. 302 So. 2d at 773.
26. 287 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
27. Id. at 402.
28. Coffman v. Jordan, 305 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
29. FLA. STAT. §§ 28.241, 34.041 (Supp. 1974).
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C. Judges
Rule 1.035(b) allows the judges of the circuit court, by a major-
ity vote, to issue a general order setting forth the fees charged by
court reporters. The order shall be uniform throughout the jurisdic-
tion of the court and shall be recorded. In Reedus v. Friedman,30 the
petitioner sought an order of mandamus to compel a court reporter
to transcribe testimony at fifty cents a page as designated by Florida
Statutes section 29.03 (1973). The reporter demanded one dollar
and fifty cents per page as voted by a majority of the circuit court
judges at a meeting. The District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held that since no order had been filed or recorded as required by
rule 1.035, the statute would govern in this case; the judges' taking
a vote was insufficient to satisfy the rule.
The Supreme Court of Florida has adopted rule 1.025, which
provides for a conference of county court judges to better the judicial
system and its practices through conferences and institutes.3 '
In David & Dash, Inc. v. Capitol Fixture & Construction
Corp.,32 the defendant filed a motion under Florida Statutes section
38.10 (1973) to disqualify the trial judge for bias. The challenged
judge held the motion insufficient as a matter of law. The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, agreed because no grounds for dis-
qualification were stated in the motion and the supporting affida-
vits did not meet the tests of Hahn v. Frederick.33
"In each county where there is no resident circuit judge and the
county court judge has been a member of the bar for at, least 5 years
and is qualified to be a circuit judge," the chief justice of the Su-
preme Court upon the recommendation of the chief judge of the
circuit may designate the county court judge to preside over circuit
court cases temporarily.34
D. Attorneys
Rule 1.030(d) provides that a settlement agreement must be
signed by the party or his attorney before it can be enforced against
the party. 3 Another provision of this rule was strictly interpreted in
30. 287 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 297 So. 2d 28 (1974).
31. In re Conference of County Court Judges, 290 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1973).
32. 292 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
33. 66 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1953). The requirements are:
(1) the affidavit shall state facts and reasons for the belief of bias,
(2) the facts stated shall be supported in substance.
34. FLA. STAT. § 26.57 (Supp. 1974).
35. Alaimo v. Tirone, 297 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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Arnold v. Arnold36 as to parol agreements between counsel. The trial
court had entered a final order of dissolution of marriage following
conferences with counsel for both parties as to their agreement on
the financial terms of the order. The wife's motion to vacate, which
alleged that there had been no agreement by counsel or the parties,
was denied by the trial judge. The Third District reversed the final
order since it was not supported by the record. Rule 1.030(d) re-
quired that parol agreements between counsel either be made part
of the record or transcribed as part of the proceedings. The record
did not show evidence of a writing nor incorporation of the actual
agreement into the proceedings transcribed. Mere reference to it in
the court's order was insufficient.
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
A. In General
A court must have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
as well as subject matter jurisdiction, in order to proceed. When the
court does not acquire this personal jurisdiction, any judgment ren-
dered as to the defendant is void, and he should be dismissed as a
party to the litigation.37
In Bussey v. Legislative Auditing Committee,38 the appellant
moved to dismiss a complaint, alleging that the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction over his person due to insufficiency of process. The ap-
pellant had failed to appear before a legislative committee, which
had served him personally with a subpoena. The committee then
filed a complaint, pursuant to Florida Statutes section 11.143(4)(b)
(1973), which provided that "the court shall take jurisdiction of the
witness and the subject matter of said complaint," and requested
the court to direct the appellant to comply with the subpoena. The
court issued an order to show cause" which, along with the com-
plaint, was served on appellant's attorney. The First District held
that even though the statute conferred subject matter jurisdiction
36. 292 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
37. Kingswood Builders, Inc. v. Wall Plumbing & Heating Co., 287 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1974); see Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Capellia, 302 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974), discussed
in section VII, c infra.
38. 298 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
39. The court's order directed appellant
to show cause why the Court should not direct the witnesses to appear before the
Committee and why, upon failure to appear pursuant to the Court's Order, he
should not be adjudged in direct and criminal contempt of court.
Id. at 220.
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to the court, "the court has no jurisdiction to proceed to judgment
against a defendant until proper notice is given to that defendant
of the action or proceedings against him."40
Service on the attorney alone at the institution of a suit was not
enough to confer jurisdiction, although it would have been were the
cause pending.4 Here, personal service on the appellant himself was
required and under the facts of this case neither the service of the
subpoena nor the statute could confer such prior jurisdiction.
B. Personal Service
"[It is the public policy of Florida that its long arm statute
reach as far as the United States Constitution permits."4 Babson
Brothers Co. v. Allison43 and Heritage Corp. v. Apartment Investors,
Inc. " dealt with the constitutional problem of whether there were
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state both to invoke
service under the long arm statutes and to satisfy due process.
Babson Brothers involved Florida Statutes section 48.181
(1973)." 5 An Illinois corporation denied that it ever had a dealer in
Florida; however, the conflicting evidence showed that a representa-
tive of the company delivered to the plaintiff, in Florida, a notice
of cancellation of the dealership from which this action arose. Also,
a representative had worked in Florida for over three months with
the dealer and made frequent visits in the state thereafter. In addi-
tion, books and records were kept in the Florida office for the Illinois
corporation. The First District held that these combined activities
constituted "doing business" within the meaning of section 48.181
and upheld jurisdiction.
In Heritage, Florida brokers sued a Kansas corporation, a Flor-
ida resident, and his Kansas partner for a commission. The defen-
dant partners had actively sought a loan in Florida and the plain-
tiffs obtained a loan commitment for them. The defendants refused
the loan and the plaintiffs instituted suit and served process. The
trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss as to the Kan-
sas corporation and the Kansas partner but not as to the Florida
40. Id. at 221.
41. Id. at 221, citing Reizen v. Fla. Nat'l Bank, 237 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
42. Babson Bros. Co. v. Allison, 298 So. 2d 450, 453 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
43. Id.
44. 285 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
45. In pertinent part Florida Statutes section 48.181(3) (1973) provides that one who
"sells... by any means. . . through brokers . . . to any person, firm or corporation in this
state shall be conclusively presumed" to be doing business.
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partner. On appeal th6 District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held service valid as to all defendants. Under Florida Statutes sec-
tion 48.081(5) (1973) service on the Florida resident as an officer of
the corporation was sufficient service on the Kansas corporation.
Under Florida Statutes section 48.061(1) (1973) service on the Flor-
ida partner was valid as to the Kansas partner. The court further
noted that even if the above statutes did not apply, the defendants
were "doing business" within the purview of Florida Statutes sec-
tion 48.181 (1973).
However, in Erie Insurance Exchange v. Hoffman,4" a foreign
insurer not licensed to do business in Florida could not be served
pursuant to Florida Statutes section 48.181 (1973) since its only
contact with Florida was that its policy holder traveled into the
state.
Another long arm statute, Florida Statutes section 48.193
(1973),11 effective July 1, 1973, has been held to be prospective in
application only. In Marshall v. Johnson,8 the First District held
that the statute cannot be applied to obtain service of process in an
action in which the cause arose prior to the effective date of the
statute and where there was no prior effective method of service
obtainable. 9
The burden of proof to sustain service of process under the long
arm statutes is on the party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdic-
tion. 0 Where neither party offered testimony or documentary evi-
dence relating to service of process, mere reliance on the bare allega-
tions of sufficient contacts in the complaint did not meet this requi-
site standard of proof."' Likewise, where the plaintiff did not offer
further evidence to support the allegations of its complaint in order
to rebut the defendant's affidavit to a motion to dismiss, the burden
was not met. 2
46. 302 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
47. The statute replaces Florida Statutes section 48.182 (1971) and increases the number
of situations where longarm jurisdiction applies.
48. 301 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
49. Accord, Barton v. Keyes Co., 305 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); see Gordon v. John
Deere Co., 264 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1972).
50. See Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 128 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1961).
51. Nichols v. Seabreeze Prop., Inc., 302 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974) (proof of service
under FLA. STAT. §§ 48.161, .181 (1973)).
52. Atlas Aircraft Corp. v. Buckingham, 302 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974) (proof of
service under FLA. STAT. § 48.181 (1973)); see Pan Americana Tel., Inc. v. Latin Media
Consult., Corp., 300 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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C. Substituted Service
In order to obtain substituted service of process, two require-
ments must be met. There must be service on an in-state agent and
a copy of the summons and complaint must be mailed to the out-
of-state defendant. The defendant's return receipt must then be
filed. In Crews v. Rholfing,3 the plaintiff attempted substituted
service of process on the defendant. He served the Secretary of State
of Florida as allowed by Florida Statutes section 48.161 (1973) for
traffic accidents arising in Florida. A copy of the summons and
complaint was then mailed to an address in Albany, Georgia where
the defendant had been working. The letter was returned marked
"Moved, Left no Address."54 Prior to this, personal service had been
attempted in Dade County, but it was returned undelivered. The
District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the requirements
for substituted service were not met. From the facts it appeared that
the defendant was not concealing his whereabouts, nor did he reject
or refuse to claim the certified letter sent to him.55
In 1975 the Florida service of process statute was amended.
Substituted service may be made by leaving the original service and
any accompanying papers with a "person of the family who is 15
years of age or older.""6 Accomplishing service of process in an action
for possession of residential premises by leaving a copy of the sum-
mons at a conspicuous place on the property is justified when nei-
ther the tenant nor a person of the tenant's family 15 years of age
or older can be found at the tenant's usual place of residence. 7
D. Constructive Service
One of the most common applications of constructive service is
in dissolution of marriage proceedings. However, a prerequisite to
service by publication in such cases is the filing of a sworn statement
that a diligent search and inquiry was made to ascertain the defen-
dant's residence.5" In order for a party to meet this standard, it is
required that he employ his available knowledge to ascertain the
location of the party sought and in so doing make a diligent and
53. 285 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
54. See Green v. Nashner, 216 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
55. 285 So. 2d at 434.
56. Fla. Laws 1975, 75-34, amending FLA. STAT. § 48.031 (1973) (emphasis added).
57. Fla. Laws 1975, 75-34, amending FLA. STAT. § 48.183 (1973) (emphasis added).
58. See FLA. STAT. § 49.011 (1973).
59. FLA. STAT. §§ 49.031, .041, .051, .061, .071 (1973).
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conscious effort to obtain information which would result in per-
sonal service. 0 In Canzoniero v. Canzoniero,6' the court found mate-
rial and substantial departures from the requirements. A husband
who had been separated from his wife ten years earlier sought a
dissolution of marriage. He filed the required sworn statement and
specified the address he and his wife had occupied ten years ago as
the wife's residence. He made no inquiry as to the current where-
abouts of his wife, although he easily could have contacted his chil-
dren for this information. He clearly did not employ his avallable
knowledge to get the correct address of his wife. Thus, service had
not been perfected under the constructive service statute to give the
court jurisdiction and the judgment of dissolution was reversed.
Under recent amendments to Florida's constructive service of
process statute, in proceedings for dissolution or annulment of mar-
riage, in proceedings for adoption, and where personal service of
process is not required by the Florida statutes or constitution or the
United States Constitution, "the clerk of the court shall post notices
of [the] action . . . when such notices are required of persons au-
thorized to proceed as insolvents and poverty stricken persons" un-
less the county has established a court docket fund62 to pay for "the
cost of the publication of the fact of the filing of any civil case in
the Circuit Court" in a designated newspaper. 3
When service may be accomplished by publication in a newspa-
per, the newspaper
at the time of such publication shall have been in existence for 1
year [rather than having been continuously published at least
once each week] and shall have been entered as second-class
mail matter at a post office in the county where published ...
[unless] there shall be no newspaper in existence [in that
county] which shall have been published for the length of time
above prescribed. 4
III. VENUE
A. In General
Although a plaintiff initially elects venue, the defendant may
60. Canzoniero v. Canzoniero, 305 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
61. Id.
62. Fla. Laws 1975, 75-205, amending FLA. STAT. § 49.10(1)(b) (Supp. 1974).
63. Fla. Laws 1975, 75-206, creating FLA. STAT. § 50.071 (1975).
64. FLA. STAT. § 50.031 (Supp. 1974).
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plead and prove that it is improper. He may do so by motion" or
he may assert it in his answer." However, if a party fails to raise
the issue, it is waived." In Fixel v. Clevenger,"5 the plaintiff elected
venue in Dade County. The defendant filed his answer but did not
object to the venue. Subsequently, the defendant moved for a trans-
fer of venue on the grounds that both the defendant and plaintiff
resided in Broward County and the events complained of occurred
there. The trial court held that the defendant had waived his right
in accord with the above stated principles and refused to allow a
change of venue for the convenience of the parties pursuant to Flor-
ida Statutes section 47.122 (1973). The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, affirmed as to waiver and noted that section 47.122
is discretionary; although the trial court could have granted the
defendant's motion, failure to do so was no abuse of discretion.
Florida Statutes section 47.011 (1973) provides that, as against
a single defendant residing in one county, an action shall be brought
where he resides, or "where the cause of action accrued." Stanfield
v. DeStefano"l involved a claim for breach of warranty and necessi-
tated a determination of "where the cause of action accrued." The
plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant in Polk County
for the sale of a horse. He then brought an action in that county
alleging breach of an express oral warranty that the horse was sound
of "wind and limb." The defendant, alleging improper venue,
moved to abate or transfer to Pasco County where he resided and
where the horse was delivered to the plaintiff. This motion was
denied in the trial court on the ground that the cause of action
accrued in Polk County where the contract was consummated. By
analogy to the Uniform Commercial Code, 0 the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, reversed. The cause of action accrued
where the default occurred; in the action for breach of warranty the
default occurred where the goods were delivered-Pasco County."
In an action against the Florida Public Service Commission,
the Third District has held that proper venue lies in the place of
official residence-Leon County-which has been established by
65. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b).
66. Id.
67. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h)(1).
68. 285 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
69. 300 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
70. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725(2) provides in pertinent part: "A cause of action
accrues when the breach occurs . . . .A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery
is made ...." This also appears in FLA. STAT. § 672.725(2) (1973).
71. But see Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944).
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the enacting statutes as where the defendant agency resides." Since
the action was originally filed in the wrong district, the court trans-
ferred the action pursuant to rule 1.060(b).
B. Transfer or Dismissal of Actions
Florida Statutes section 47.122 (1973) allows a change of venue
for the convenience of the parties "to any other court of record in
which [the action] might have been brought." As noted in the prior
section, it is a general rule that actions against state agencies,
boards and other governmental bodies lie only in the district of their
official residence.73
The question in Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. State,74 was whether a state agency can create a
district "where the action might have been brought" by waiving the
venue privilege. In Ringling, the plaintiff brought suit in Leon
County where the defendant government bodies resided. The defen-
dant then moved for and was granted a change of venue pursuant
to section 47.122 to Sarasota County. The First District was con-
fronted with the issue of whether Sarasota County was one where
the action might have been brought. The plaintiff contended it was
not on the ground that Florida law limited venue to the defendant's
official residence. The First District disagreed, noting that the re-
quirement of instituting an action where the state agency resides is
one "of historic policy for the convenience of the people and the
public agency, [more] than it is a fixed rule of law."75 Since the
venue privilege may be waived,7" Sarasota qualified as a county
where the action might have been brought."
A motion to dismiss alleging forum nonconveniens is a proper
challenge to venue. 78 Where the defendant demonstrated strongly
72. State Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Terrerce Indus., Inc., 294 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974);
see Florida Real Estate Comm. v. State ex rel. Bodner, 75 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1954).
73. See cases cited at note 72 supra.
74. 295 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
75. Id. at 321.
76. Id. at 318-19.
77. The venue in Leon County was waived by the State's motion to transfer to another
district. It should be noted that Florida Statutes section 47.122 (1973) is almost identical to
the federal statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a) (1975). The federal statutory provision "might
have been brought," however, has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to
allow a transfer only to a district in which the action originally could have been brought,
regardless of any waiver by the defendant. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960). Thus, the
decision of the First District in Ringling appears to be contrary to the weight of most
authorities. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 344, at 167-69 (2d ed. 1970).
78. Flota Mercante Gran Centro-Americana v. Stena Shipping AB, 294 So. 2d 98 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1974).
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the inconvenience of having Florida as the forum for the trial in an
action between two foreign corporations not authorized to do busi-
ness in Florida, the Third District found error in denying defen-
dant's motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens.71
The contract in dispute was made in Guatemala and was to be
performed in Sweden. None of the causes of action arose in Florida.
In addition, none of the parties and witnesses were Florida resi-
dents.
Although Florida Statutes section 47.122 (1973) gives a court
the power to transfer an action and rule 1.270(b) gives the power to
order a separate trial of any claim or issue, the Third District has
held that these provisions do not include the power to transfer one
or more claims or issues to a court in another jurisdiction. 0 It was
reversible error to transfer a portion of the case. The separate claims
provision of rule 1.270(b) contemplates that such claims will be
tried in the court where they are pending.
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that transfers pursuant
to section 47.122 cannot be made in contravention of Florida Stat-
utes section 47.163 (1973) which provides that "[n]o change of
venue shall be made to any county where either of the parties reside,
except by their consent."'" The plaintiff, a Second District Court of
Appeal judge, filed suit in Dade County against the defendant cor-
poration for injuries inflicted in an auto accident by the defendant's
agent. The defendant moved, pursuant to section 47.122, for a
change of venue to Hillsborough County where the accident oc-
curred, the witnesses resided, the investigatory officers were located
and the records and vehicles were located. The trial court denied the
motion but the Third District reversed, holding that section 47.122
controlled section 47.163 despite the plaintiffs contention that the
case should be tried outside Hillsborough County. "[P]laintiff...
wished to avoid all thoughts of indelicacy or [the] appearance of
impropriety"82 because Hillsborough County is within the Second
District where he is an appellate judge. On certiorari review, the
supreme court reversed. In somewhat confusing terminology the
court stated that section 47.122, a discretionary general statute, "is
presumed to have made an exception to the prior specific, manda-
tory statute [47.163] . "3 While this language implies that the
79. Id.
80. Zuckerman-Vernon Corp. v. Zelikoff, 303 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
81. Mann v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 300 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1974), rev'g 285 So. 2d
681 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
82. 285 So. 2d at 682.
83. 300 So. 2d at 668.
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Third District opinion was correct, the court's holding indicates
otherwise. Thus, in Florida it appears that a motion for a transfer
of venue under the forum nonconveniens statute is subject to the
privilege of a party to refuse transfer to a county where he resides.
IV. THE INITIAL PHASES OF AN ACTION
A. Setting Forth a Cause of Action
1. COMPLAINT
An essential function of the complaint is to acquaint the defen-
dant with the plaintiff's charge. Although a plaintiff fails to allege
all the elements of a cause of action, this function can still be per-
formed. In Rio v. Minton,4 the plaintiff alleged in his complaint
that the defendant allowed the decedent to consume alcoholic bev-
erages on his premises and then allowed the decedent to drive his
car; that the defendant should have known that the decedent's fac-
ulties would be impaired in his inebriated condition; and that the
decedent lost control of the car and died in the resulting crash. The
trial court dismissed the action against the defendant since no
breach of a legal obligation on the part of the defendant had been
alleged. The Second District reversed the trial court on this point
and held that this short and plain statement of facts was sufficient
to show that the pleader was entitled to relief and to enable the
defendant to construct an answer intelligently.
Another pleading requirement liberally construed by the courts
is that a complaint must state a cause of action. 5 Where a count in
a complaint does not state a specific cause of action but does state
sufficient facts upon which to base some cause of action, a motion
to dismiss should not be granted."0
While a complaint must state facts, it is not necessary nor even
desirable that it contain evidence in support of its allegations. 7 In
one case, an insurance policy covered treatment in a "hospital."
The District Court of Appeal, First District, held that it was not
necessary for the plaintiffs to have supporting evidence in their
complaint that the institution, where their son was being treated,
was a "hospital" within the meaning of the policy."8
84. 291 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
85. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b).
86. Padgett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 297 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974). Sorrells
v. Mullins, 303 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); see Nelson v. Growers Ford Tractor Co., 282
So. 2d 664 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). But cf Wells v. Brown, 303 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
87. Dawson v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 293 So. 2d 90, 92 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
88. Id.
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In a recent case,89 the Supreme Court of Florida used the follow-
ing principles to test the sufficiency of a complaint: (1) the court
must assume the facts alleged in the complaint as true; 0 (2) affirm-
ative defenses should not be anticipated; and (3) assuming the facts
alleged can be proved, query whether the plaintiff is entitled to
relief.
Rule 1.90011 sets out the manner of using suggested forms to
comply with the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1.900(b)
provides that the form of complaints as set out in the rules can be
varied to meet the facts of a particular case so long as the substance
of the matter is expressed. Although form 1.939 (conversion) pro-
vides for insertion of the monetary value of the converted property
in the complaint, failure to assert a value need not result in dis-
missal.2
2. COUNTERCLAIMS, CROSSCLAIMS AND THIRD PARTY COMPLAINTS
In order to avoid a multiplicity of law suits, rule 1.170(f) pro-
vides that "[w]hen a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through
oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect or when justice re-
quires, he may set up the counterclaim by amendment with leave
of the court." The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held in
Romish v. Albol3 that the trial court abused its discretion when it
refused the defendant leave to amend his answer under this rule.
Counsel for the defendant learned for the first time during discovery
that his client had incurred sufficient medical expenses under the
no-fault insurance statute to afford him a right of action in an
automobile negligence case. The court, stating that the counter-
claim was "compulsory," ordered leave to amend as allowed by the
rule. However, it explicitly left open the question whether the coun-
terclaim could be asserted in a later suit if not plead in the present
suit."
Another provision of rule 1.170 is that if the counterclaim is for
an amount exceeding the jurisdictional amount of the court in
89. Hammonds v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 285 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1973).
90. See also Smyler v. Katzer, 289 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
91. Rule 1.900 was approved by the Supreme Court of Florida in In re Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, 211 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1968).
92. Thrasher v. First Nat'l Bank, 288 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). Some matters
however must be pleaded with specificity and particularity. An action for rescission of a
contract on grounds of mistake is such a case. Arvida Corp. v. Nu-way Plumbing, Inc., 295
So. 2d 118 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974); see FiA. R. Civ. P. 1.120(b).
93. 291 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
94. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a).
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which the action is pending, the action should be transferred to a
court of proper jurisdiction. 5 Once the action is transferred, the
transferee court has full jurisdiction over the entire claim and it
should not transfer the cause back to the transferor court even
though subsequent events indicate that it would not have had juris-
diction but for the transfer.96
A third party complaint differs from a counterclaim; in the
former, service is made by the defendant on a person not a party to
the original action who may be liable to the defendant or the plain-
tiff as third party plaintiff for all or part of the original plaintiff's
claim against the defendant." It is not necessary, however, that the
third party plaintiff be able to recover against the third party defen-
dant based solely on the allegations of the original plaintiffs com-
plaint. Thus, in Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Brown,"5 Brown, in-
jured when a boxcar door fell on him, sued Seaboard, his employer,
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act 9 for failure to provide
a safe place to work. Seaboard then filed a third party complaint
against Cargill, a freight loader, alleging that it was Cargill's negli-
gent loading of the boxcar which caused Brown's injury. The trial
court dismissed the third party complaint for failure to state a cause
of action. This dismissal was based on the fact that the allegations
in Brown's complaint foreclosed Seaboard from recovery against
Cargill "as a matter of law." The Second District reversed. Clearly,
rule 1.180 "allows the original defendant [as third party plaintiff]
to place his own characterization on the events."'99
Among its provisions, rule 1.180, dealing with third party prac-
tice, provides that a third party defendant may assert against the
original plaintiff any defenses which the third party plaintiff has to
the plaintiffs claim. The third party defendant may also assert any
claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the sub-
ject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third party plaintiff.
In Watson v. G & C Ford Co.,'"' a verdict was directed for the
defendant, and the defendant's third party complaint against a
95. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(0).
96. See Watt v. Bill Branch Chevrolet, Inc., 292 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
97. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180.
98. 297 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
99. 48 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1970).
100. 297 So. 2d at 844. It should be noted that the court misquoted the rule in its
decision. The court stated the rule as: "The third party defendant may also assert any claim
against the third party defendant. ... The rule reads: "The third party defendant may
also assert any claim against the plaintiff . However, this error should not affect the
holding.
101. 293 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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third party defendant was dismissed with prejudice. On appeal the
directed verdict was reversed and on remand the original plaintiff
prevailed. The defendant did not appeal the dismissal of its third
party complaint. As a consequence of the verdict on remand, the
trial court vacated its earlier directed verdict. However, it also va-
cated its dismissal of the third party complaint and reinstated it.
The third party defendants objected. On appeal the First District
held that it would be inequitable to allow the third party complaint
to be reinstated because the third party defendants would be de-
prived of the above mentioned procedural advantages of rule 1.180.
3. CLASS ACTIONS
Rule 1.220 simply provides that "[w]hen the question is one
of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class
so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before
the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole." However,
the courts have adopted rules of interpretation which make it in-
creasingly difficult to maintain a class action. Sams v. Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc. "I involved the requirement that a "community of inter-
est" must exist among the class action plaintiffs. The claims, issues
and defenses must be common to all members of the class."3 Sams
was a class action by former employees, permanently replaced after
a strike, to collect sums allegedly due under a profit sharing plan.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, found that there was
not a community of interest because the benefits of the plans to the
employees differed according to age, length of employment, contri-
bution to the plan, elections under the plan and the mode of
payment. Thus each employee had an independent interest and
therefore "cooperative enterprise" was lacking.'"4 Likewise, this
principle was applied in Costin v. Hargraves,"5 a declaratory judg-
ment action brought by owners of property fronted by the beach to
settle the status of the beach property. Each owner had acquired his
property under separate contracts, and at least four different theo-
102. 294 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
103. Costin v. Hargraves, 283 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
104. See Randall v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 296 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1974) (a
party under an insurance contract has an independent interest and therefore a suit by a
number of persons under the same policy is foreclosed as a class action).
105. 283 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). It is worthy of note that, in this case, each
plaintiff depended upon different facts to support his claim as well as different theories of
action. However, the court's emphasis on the different defenses of the several defendants
should not have been important to its decision because rule 1.220 only refers to a common
interest among plaintiffs.
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ries of relief were relied upon by different plaintiffs. Each plaintiff's
interest extended only to that covered by his respective contract.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the necessary com-
munity of interest and the court held that the suit could not be
maintained as a class action.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Wilson,' 6 refused to allow a group of
telephone customers to bring a class action. In Southern Bell, phone
service of an undetermined number of customers was cut off for a
period greater than 24 hours. Plaintiffs representing the class were
customers who experienced this loss of service and demanded an
adjustment in their monthly bill. 107 The class was designated as all
those customers of Southern Bell who through no fault of their own
experienced this loss of service and did not receive a rebate. While
the class clearly was "so numerous as to make it impracticable to
bring them all before the court"'' 8 it was also speculative.," A fac-
tual determination would have to be made whether a customer had
caused his own loss of service or whether he even experienced such
a loss.
The court also found the action to be lacking in two other re-
spects. There was no showing of a common or general interest
among the class members as to obtaining relief"' and plaintiffs did
not show that they represented the interests of the class."'
Although a class action may not be maintainable because the
asserted class is too indefinite or community of interest is lacking,
the Supreme Court of Florida has held that dismissal of the class
action does not justify dismissal of the complaint for failure to state
an individual cause of action. In Harrell v. Hess Oil and Chemical
Corp.,"' riparian land owners on a creek as well as all persons using
the creek were the designated class. The action alleged that the
106. 305 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
107. The plaintiffs sought to enforce regulations, governing this public utility, which
provided for compensation to customers for loss of service for periods in excess of 24 hours.
In view of this regulation, the court stated: "If this is so, then the appellees seek to perform
a public service, i.e., the enforcement of lawful rules and regulations for the benefit of the
public." Id. at 303-04.
108. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220.
109. 305 So. 2d at 305.
110. The court noted that the interests among commercial, residential, urban and rural
customers may have been divergent.
111. The plaintiffs did not allege that they represented a cross-section of the involved
parties (i.e., businessmen, companies, rural customers and city customers). Their claim of
membership in the class was not enough. 305 So. 2d at 305.
112. 287 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1973).
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defendant's actions caused pollution of the creek to the detriment
of the whole class. The court dismissed the class action but upheld
the complaint as to the named plaintiffs. Since rule 1.250 provides
that "misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal of an ac-
tion" the sufficiency of the complaint can be tested by treating the
allegations relating solely to the class action "as having been
stricken from the complaint by ordering dismissal of the complaint
insofar as a class action was asserted .. .""3 Even though plain-
tiffs failed to amend the complaint to eliminate class action allega-
tions, the question as to the individual claims must be considered." 4
Another rather obvious requirement is that as a representative
of the class, one must be a member of it. Thus, where a plaintiff
employee voluntarily removed himself from the class by leaving his
job, a dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted is proper."'
One case during this survey period did meet all the require-
ments necessary to maintain a class action. It was a taxpayer suit
for a refund. In State ex rel. Devlin v. Dickinson,"' the members of
the class were tenant-stockholders in their respective cooperative
apartment associations. All of them had achieved this status prior
to October 1, 1970, and had paid a statutory documentary stamp
tax,"7 effective only after October 1, 1970, on their cooperative
shares. They also had applied for a refund to the Department of
Revenue as provided by statute. "8 The First District found that the
claims, issues and defenses were common to all the members of the
class."9 There was a community of interest because the tax was
uniformly applied; the character of relief (a refund) was available
to all, and all members occupied the same position with respect to
their respective properties. The class was sufficiently definite be-
cause it was limited to those who had applied for a rebate. Finally,
the representatives were a good cross-section because the claims of
the members were uniform and their interests the same.
Furthermore, class action status has been legislatively created
for condominium associations on behalf of unit owners with refer-
113. Id. at 295.
114. Id.; accord, Evans v. St. Regis Paper Co., 287 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1974).
115. Jackson v. Alterman Trans. Lines, Inc., 301 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
116. 305 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
117. FLA. STAT. § 201.02 (1973).
118. FLA. STAT. § 215.26 (1973).
119. See Costin v. Hargraves, 283 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
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ence to matters of common interest, when its board of administra-
tion is not controlled by the developer.'
4. AMENDING THE PLEADINGS
Rule 1.190 provides for leave to amend at any time and "leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires." It appears from a
recent case that leave to amend may be waived by conduct and once
waived, leave may not be granted subsequently by the trial court.
In St. Joe Paper Co. v. Connell,2' the plaintiffs brought an action
to quiet title under a theory of adverse possession without color of
title.' During the course of the trial, the judge suggested to the
plaintiffs that they amend their complaint to include a claim of
adverse possession under color of title because it did not appear that
they were going to prove their original complaint. Plaintiffs refused
this offer. Subsequently, the court found for the defendant, but gave
the plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint within 15 days
alleging a claim under color of title. From this order the defendant
appealed.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, held that the trial
court erred in granting leave to amend after the plaintiffs had re-
jected this opportunity during the trial. The First District noted
that this was not a case where leave was sought after trial to conform
the pleading to the evidence.'23 While it appears that this case dem-
onstrates waiver of leave to amend, it is also apparent from the
court's language that it thought justice would not be served by
granting leave to amend.
[Pilaintiffs, ignoring admonitions and suggestions of the trial
judge . . . made a binding election to proceed without amend-
ment . . . . [Ilt would be most unfair to force the defendants
to bear the hazards, harassment and expenses of a second trial.
A second bite at the apple may not be granted .... 124
In another recent case, the appellate court held that leave to
amend an answer to a writ of garnishment by a motion ore tenus
120. FLA. STAT. § 711.12(2) (Supp. 1974).
121. 299 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
122. FLA. STAT. § 95.18 (1973). In Florida, this action is different from one for adverse
possession under color of title. See FLA. STAT. § 95.16 (1973).
123. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(b). But see Ranger Ins. Co. v. Airvac, Inc., 302 So. 2d 801
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1974) (Amended pleading allowed where there was some evidence in the record
that the issue sought to be pleaded by the parties had been tried by consent).
124. 299 So. 2d at 93 (emphasis added).
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should have been granted in the interest of justice, although the
court noted that the garnishee's attempt to obtain leave through
"amendment by reservation" did not comply with rule 1.190. In
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Crabtree Construction Co.,' 25 the
plaintiff brought an action against the defendant to collect a debt.
A writ of garnishment was served on Florida Power, which was
indebted to the defendant for certain uncompleted construction
contracts. This debt was unliquidated. The garnishee (Florida
Power) answered the writ, admitting the debt to the defendant
and reserving the right to amend its answer when the debt was
liquidated as the amount could have been less than that due the
plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff obtained a default against
the defendant and moved for final judgment against the garnishee.
In the meantime, the defendant had breached its contract with
the garnishee. Consequently, the garnishee owed the defendant
nothing. The garnishee attempted to amend its answer, first
through its reservation without leave, then by motion ore tenus,
stipulating that it was no longer indebted to the defendant. The
trial court refused to allow the amendment. On appeal, the trial
judge was reversed. The Fourth District cited the liberal spirit of the
rules stating that the trial judge abused his discretion as the amend-
ment would not prejudice the plaintiff2 who had not made substan-
tial trial preparation. Furthermore, the failure to allow it grossly
prejudiced the amending party who lost a valuable defense. The
Fourth District thus held that although the rules do not provide for
the reservation of the right to amend, the garnishee's motion ore
tenus to amend its answer should have been granted.
Since the major purpose of liberally allowing amendments to
pleadings is to get to the merits of a case, leave to amend should be
allowed even after a summary judgment has been granted.'27 How-
ever, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend during
a trial where such amendment seeks to change completely the basis
of the action."8 Nor is it an abuse to deny a post-trial motion to
amend to conform to the proof at trial where the relief sought in the
proposed amended complaint was "wholly inconsistent with and
125. 283 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
126. Accord, Imverial Bonita Estates. Inc. v. Minster. 283 So. 2d 138 (Fi. 2d Dist. 1973).
127. Goid Coast Crane Serv., Inc. v. Waltier, 257 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1971); Mount Sinai
Hosp., Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 285 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); see Town of Micanopy v.
Connell, 304 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
128. Santi v. Zack Co., 287 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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unrelated to the allegations of the Complaint . . .upon which the
issues were framed for trial."'29
Not all amendments to the pleadings require leave of court. A
pleading may be amended once as a matter of right before a respon-
sive pleading, if required, is served. 3 ° However, if the matters to be
added to the complaint occurred subsequent to the date of the
pleading sought to be amended, such matters are considered a sup-
plemental pleading 3' and can only be added with leave of court.
Thus, in Florida Power & Light Co. v. System Council U-4, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,' the plaintiff filed an
amended complaint without leave of court. The original complaint
had alleged 104 union violations of a temporary restraining order.
The amended complaint alleged 43 additional violations occurring
subsequent to the filing of the original complaint and sought addi-
tional damages for civil contempt. Since these allegations fell within
the category of new facts and events, and not matters which existed
at the time of the initial filing but were omitted for some reason,
they could only be brought before the court by a supplemental com-
plaint submitted with leave of court. Thus, the amended complaint
was a nullity.
B. Defenses
A complaint acquaints the defendant with the charge against
him, 3 and likewise, the defendant, by answer, indicates the course
he plans to pursue in the litigation. In the federal courts further
pleadings are not required as both parties have demonstrated their
general positions. Thus, where a defendant's answer asserts an af-
firmative defense, no reply by the plaintiff is required under federal
rule 7(a) either to deny or avoid it.' However, in Florida, rule 1.100
requires a responsive pleading to an affirmative defense if "the op-
posing party seeks to avoid it."' 3 Whether rule 1.100 requires a
responsive pleading to effect a denial of an asserted affirmative
defense or whether denial is automatically implied when a respon-
sive pleading is not forthcoming is an important question in light
129. Kelly v. Kelly, 296 So. 2d 559, 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
130. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a).
131. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(d).
132. 307 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
133. See section IV, A, 1 supra.
134. While no reply is required, the court may under FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a) order one. Also,
a reply is required where the answer contains a counterclaim.
135. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.100(a).
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of rule 1.100(e) which provides that "lalverments in a pleading to
which a responsive pleading is required, . . . are admitted when not
denied . . . ." The question has been resolved by the Supreme
Court of Florida in the case of Moore Meats, Inc. v. Strawn.135
The confusion surrounding rule 1.100 which prompted the
court's decision in Moore Meats arose from its earlier holding in
Gulf Life Insurance Co. v. Ferguson.'37 In Gulf Life, the court re-
versed a trial court decision which had held that a reply to an
affirmative defense need not be filed. On its face the supreme
court's reversal implies that a responsive pleading is required either
to deny or avoid an affirmative defense. But the case does not stand
for that proposition and is therefore misleading without a considera-
tion of the underlying facts. The affirmative defense asserted in Gulf
Life by the defendant was fraud. 3 ' The plaintiff failed to file a reply,
but at trial, sought to avoid the fraud defense by asserting waiver
and estoppel by the defendant. In essence, the plaintiff was not
denying the fraud defense, but seeking to avoid it by asserting a new
matter as to why it should not be given effect."9 Since the scope of
the trial is governed by the pleadings, the supreme court correctly
held, under the predecessor of rule 1.100,14° that the plaintiff could
not put into issue waiver and estoppel of the alleged defense of fraud
without just having raised these new matters by way of avoidance
in a responsive pleading. In Moore Meats, after discussing the fac-
tual situation in Gulf Life, the supreme court held that an affirma-
tive defense is implicitly deemed denied by rule 1.100 if no respon-
sive pleading to it is filed. But if new matter is sought to be
introduced to avoid the defense, then a reply is required.'
A recent Third District case has defined explicitly what affirm-
ative defenses are contemplated by rule 1.100.142 The court deter-
mined that a mere denial in an answer is not an affirmative defense.
Only matters which assert a new point previously outside the plead-
ings (such as fraud) are affirmative defenses, as well as those listed
in rule 1.110(d). 143
136. 313 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1975).
137. 59 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1952).
138. The effect of this was a simple denial of the asserted facts. 313 So. 2d at 661.
139. Id.
140. 30 F.S.A. Rules of Common Law, rule 9d. In pertinent part the rule provides: "In
pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . any other matter
constituting an avoidance .... "
141. Accord, Trawick, To Reply or Not to Reply, 47 Fla. B. J. 702 (1973).
142. American Salvage & Jobbing Co. v. Salomon, 295 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
143. Based on its rule, the court held that where the defendant's denial did not raise a
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As a general rule a statute of limitations"' is an affirmative
defense which must be asserted as such in an answer or it is
waived." 5 However, if an affirmative defense appears on the face of
a prior pleading although not in the answer, it may, nonetheless, be
asserted as grounds for a motion to dismiss."' In Timmins v.
Firestone,"' the plaintiff on December 15, 1971, filed a complaint
alleging conspiracy by the defendant to libel him. The alleged acts
of libel appeared in a newspaper during July of 1966-the time when
the cause of action arose. The defense of statute of limitations,
although not raised explicitly by the defendant, was evident from
the face of plaintiff's complaint. Since the statute of limitations for
conspiracy is four years, defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a cause of action was correctly granted."'
Another exception to the rule of waiver for failing to assert an
affirmative defense in an answer exists if the parties try the issue
by express or implied consent."9 However, in Langlois v. Oriole
Land & Development Corp.'5° the Fourth District held that this
exception was not met where the defendant failed to plead in the
answer the statute of frauds and for the first time mentioned this
affirmative defense during argument on a motion for directed ver-
dict at the close of plaintiff's case, and then again asserted the
statute during argument on a motion for a directed verdict after the
close of all the evidence. Since the issue had not been tried, the
Fourth District found that "the defendant had waived the affirma-
tive defense of the Statute of Frauds and the [lower] court erred
in permitting a post-trial amendment to include such affirmative
defense."' 5'
In some situations there is a fine line of distinction between
affirmative defenses and counterclaims. To avoid penalizing a party
for improper designation, rule 1.110(d) provides that "[w]hen a
new issue, it was error for the trial court to hold that the plaintiff admitted under rule 1.110(e)
the defendant's "affirmative defense." Id.
144. The statutes of limitations provisions in the Florida Statutes were amended in FLA.
STAT. ch. 95 et seq. (Supp. 1974), as amended, Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-734.
145. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d).
146. Timmins v. Firestone, 283 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
147. Id.
148. Accord, Cohodas v. Russell, 289 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
149. See Trans World Machine Corp. v. Threlkeld, 201 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967),
cert. denied, 210 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 1968).
150. 283 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973); see Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Magnuson,
288 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974) (where the defendant attempted to get the pretrial order
amended to assert the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk).
151. 283 So. 2d at 145.
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party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a
counterclaim as a defense, the court, on terms if justice so requires,
shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation."
In Moore Meats, Inc. v. Alterman Transport, Inc.,152 a unique fac-
tual situation was presented for the application of this rule. A truck-
ing company sought to recover the full amount of freight charges
due it, but the defendant designated as an affirmative defense an
accord and satisfaction because the transported goods were dam-
aged. Applicable federal law governing freight rate structures does
not permit agreements lowering rates even where goods are dam-
aged. Thus, in order to recover, the defendant should have alleged
a compulsory counterclaim for damages. The Third District could
have treated the defense as a counterclaim, but instead affirmed the
trial court decision awarding the plaintiff recovery on its rate claim
but allowing the defendant the opportunity to raise its claim for
damages in an independent suit. While this procedure is clearly
permissible under rule 1.170(f) concerning omitted counterclaims,
it would have been simpler for the court to have designated the
defense as counterclaim under 1.110(d) and thereby have elimi-
nated another trial.
C. Pretrial Conference
Pretrial conferences help simplify the issues for trial; a court
order designates the issues to be considered for trial as those not
disposed of by admissions or agreements of the parties.'53 In a recent
"slip and fall" case the pretrial order limited the issues to negli-
gence, contributory negligence and damages. Under these circum-
stances the Second District held that it was not necessary for the
plaintiff to prove the defendant's ownership of the garbage can over
which he tripped.' However, this decision will not result in binding
parties to admissions they did not intend to make. Rule 1.200(c)
specifically allows modification of the pretrial order to prevent in-
justice.
V. PARTIES
A. Necessary and Proper Parties
Usually a plaintiff can decide who the parties to his lawsuit will
152. 301 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
153. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200.
154. Sellars v. Cosby, 289 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
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be. However, some persons must be made party defendants when
their presence is necessary to a complete determination of the cause.
For example, where the defendant's insurer is sued in a negligence
action, a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the insured
person can result in a dismissal for failure to join an indispensable
party. 55
Furthermore, a defendant may assert that a plaintiff lacks suf-
ficient legal interest to bring the suit. However, this assertion has
been rejected in certain direct actions against insurers. In
Shingleton v. Bussey,59 the insurer claimed that the plaintiff lacked
sufficient legal interest to sue the insurer directly, as he was not a
party to the insurance contract, which contained a "no direct ac-
tion" clause. The court ruled that the plaintiff was a third party
beneficiary and could bring suit directly against the insurer. The
insurer also claimed that the jury would be prejudiced by knowing
that an affluent institution would bear the loss and thus the jury
would be more prone to find liability. The court rejected this "os-
trich head in sand" approach to juries.
The third party beneficiary rationale of Shingleton was applied
in Spindler v. Kushner.5 ' Improved property had been transferred
to the buyer prior to a property closing subject to an agreement that
if the deal were not consummated, the premises would be redeliv-
ered to the seller in substantially the same condition. The buyer had
procured fire insurance on the premises which subsequently were
destroyed by fire. Determining that the buyer had an insurable
interest in the property, the Third District allowed the seller, now
owner of the property, to enforce the payment provisions of the
policy in a direct action against the insurer.
B. Joinder and Severance
1. IN GENERAL
The rules as to joinder of parties' and severance of claims'59
provide sufficient flexibility to prevent delays and prejudice to the
parties. They also foster "the elimination of multiplicity of suits and
unreasonable impediments to the remedial process of adjudication
155. Insurance Co. of N. America v. Braddon, 285 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
156. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
157. 284 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); accord, Schlehuber v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
158. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.250(c).
159. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.270(b).
[Vol. XXX
CIVIL PROCEDURE
of adversary rights . . . ."I" The Supreme Court of Florida in a
somewhat confused opinion has developed guidelines for joinder and
severance in multiple collision automobile cases. In Lawrence v.
Hethcox,16 ' the plaintiff was injured by the defendant Hethcox in an
automobile accident and filed suit. The plaintiff was later involved
in an accident with Gist and sought to amend his complaint against
Hethcox to join Gist as a party defendant because "the injuries
sustained in both accidents were overlapping... "'I' and in addi-
tion there would be difficulty in apportioning the damages between
the defendants. The trial court denied plaintiff's joinder motion and
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, denied certiorari re-
view." 3 The supreme court granted conflict certiorari and held that
joinder should have been granted. The court noted that on remand,
if the trial court indeed finds from pretrial discovery that the dam-
ages are apportionable and that joinder was therefore improper,
severance of plaintiff's claims against the respective defendants
could then be granted in the trial judge's discretion pursuant to rule
1.270(b). Neither party would be bound by the terms of the judg-
ment against the other.
The supreme court further explained that if
[oin the other hand ...it become[s] apparent as a result of
pretrial discovery measures that although joinder was proper be-
cause of difficulty or impossibility of apportionment of damages,
prejudice to either defendant would nevertheless result from a
single trial, severance for trial purposes only would be permissible
with the same limitations as provided in Shingleton v. Bussey
. ..and Beta Eta House Corp., Inc. of Tallahassee v. Gregory
164
Both Beta Eta and Shingleton permit severance but require the
moving party-usually the defendant's insurance carrier-to be
bound by the resulting judgment against the remaining defend-
ant. '6 Yet the application of this limited severance rule in the
Hethcox situation ignores a relevant distinction. Binding a severed
defendant to a judgment against a remaining defendant may be
160. Lawrence v. Hethcox, 283 So. 2d 41, 44 (Fla. 1973).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 42.
163. Lawrence v. Hethcox, 260 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), quashed, 283 So. 2d 41
(Fla. 1973).
164. 283 So. 2d at 44-45 (citations omitted).
165. See id. at 44. "Essentially, the effect of those cases is to permit severance but to
require the moving party to be bound by the resulting judgment." Id.
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logical in an insurance situation since the defendant insurer has
contracted to pay for the damages caused by the defendant insured.
The logic breaks down, however, in the Hethcox situation because
Hethcox involved separate accidents and contractually unrelated
defendants.
Furthermore, the court's reliance on Shingleton and Beta Eta
as to the state of the law concerning severability appears misplaced
since the supreme court neglected to cite its later decision of
Stetcher v. Pomeroy' which clarified the severability issue in insur-
ance cases. Stetcher held that even if prejudice might result from
joinder, severance should not be allowed "absent a justiciable issue
relating to insurance, such as a question of coverage or of the appli-
cability or interpretation of the insurance policy or other such valid
dispute on the matter of insurance coverage . ... "I
Since Stetcher also involved a question of liability between the
defendants, its limitation on severance, as well as that enunciated
in Shingleton and Beta Eta should not apply to a two accident
situation where there is no issue of liability between the defendants.
Based on this distinction, it appears that the reference to the insur-
ance cases in the supreme court's opinion in Hethcox should be
interpreted to allow joinder only on the issue of damages where the
damages are not apportionable but to allow severance as to the
liability of the respective defendants.
Although joinder is liberally permitted, it appears that the
Third District will not allow it if it is improperly pleaded. In
Miramar Construction, Inc. v. El Conquistador Condominium,'68
defendants asserted a counterclaim. They then sought to add addi-
tional party counter-defendants by bringing a third party com-
plaint. Although unclear from the court's opinion, it appears that
the defendant wanted more co-plaintiffs against whom he could
assert his counterclaim. A third party complaint was not the proper
pleading because it goes to a person not a party to the action who
may be liable to the defendant for the plaintiff's claim against him.
Whether joinder of additional co-plaintiffs under rule 1.250(c)
would have been appropriate does not appear from the case, but the
third party complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
166. 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971).
167. Id. at 424 (original emphasis).
168. 303 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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2. JOINDER AND SEVERANCE OF INSURERS
It is well established in Florida that "the inclusion of an insurer
as a real party in interest in a personal injury action is, in itself, no
longer prejudicial or fundamental error.""1 9 Thus, the supreme court
held in Allred v. Chittenden Pool Supply, Inc. ,' that it was harm-
less error for plaintiff's counsel in his closing argument to demand
in the presence of the jury that the defendant's insurance company
"be made to pay."
However, in Pierce v. Smith, 7' the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held that it was not permissible for plaintiff's coun-
sel to make the following remarks in his closing argument:
[Plaintiff] does not have the resources nor the ability to go out
and compete with Dr. Pierce and the Pacific Indemnity Insurance
Company in bringing expert doctors to you . . . .[A]n adverse
verdict [against Dr. Pierce] will only call for his insurance com-
pany to pay the verdict that is imposed against him. . . .[After
this trial defendant's counsel] can go back to defending doctors
and insurance companies .... 7I
The court also considered that the issue of liability was very close
in the Pierce case and that the effect on the jury was greater than
in Allred, where liability was overwhelming and the alleged impas-
sioned comment not as likely to cause significant prejudice.'73
C. Intervention
Although intervention"' is not granted as a matter of right, it
should be granted where a declaratory judgment defining the right
of a party would directly affect the rights of the potential inter-
venor. "5 In Coral Bay Property Owners Association v. City of Coral
Gables,' a private school was granted a special zoning permit by
agreement with the city to operate in a residential area. The prop-
erty owners sent a letter to the city alleging that the school was in
169. Allred v. Chittenden Pool Supply, Inc., 298 So. 2d 361, 365 (Fla. 1974).
170. Id.
171. 301 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
172. Id. at 807.
173. Two other cases during the survey period dealt with this issue. Metropolitan Dade
County v. Dillon, 305 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Industrial Waste Serv., Inc. v. Henderson,
305 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
174. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.230.
175. Coral Bay Property Owners Ass'n v. City of Coral Gables, 305 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1974).
176. Id.
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violation of the terms of the agreement which authorized it to oper-
ate a grade school for 300 students through the first six grades. In
fact, however, the school had approximately 1,000 students in the
first through ninth grades. The school filed suit against the city for
declaratory relief regarding the agreement and seeking to enjoin an
investigation by the city of the property owners' charges. The Third
District allowed intervention by the property owners because the
interpretation of the terms of the aqreement against the city would
foreclose the property owners from asserting any rights they might
have had.
VI. DISCOVERY
A. Scope
The scope of discovery is very broad and may touch any un-
privileged matter which is relevant to the proceedings.'77 It func-
tions to "make a trial less a game of blind man's bluff and more a
fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest
practicable extent."'7 s In keeping with the fair trial perspective of
discovery, the Supreme Court of Florida has held that "Mary Car-
ter Agreements" must be produced for examination when they are
sought to be discovered.' A "Mary Carter Agreement" is one by
which a co-defendant secretly agrees with the plaintiff that his lia-
bility will be limited-usually diminished in proportion to the
amount the plaintiff is able to recover against the non-agreeing
defendants. The agreeing defendant remains active in the case but
with an incentive to increase his co-defendants' liability because his
own will be thereby reduced.8 0 Thus, if a jury were apprised of this
secret agreement it "would likely weigh differently the testimony
and conduct of the signing defendant as related to the non-signing
defendant."'' In Ward v. Ochoa, s2 the supreme court reasoned that
since such agreements promote deception and do not further search
for the truth, they are discoverable and admissible into evidence." 3
177. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280.
178. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
179. Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973).
180. See 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 988 (1974) for a discussion of this point and other aspects
of Ward v. Ochoa.
181. Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. 1973).
182. Id.
183. Accord, Kuhns v. Fenton, 288 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1973); Maule Indus., Inc. v. Roun-
tree, 284 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973); General Portland Land Dev. Co. v. Stevens, 291 So. 2d 250
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1974). But see Parish v. Armstrong, 302 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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In determining whether matter sought to be discovered is rele-
vant, a liberal construction should be given the scope of permissible
discovery. In one case a former husband requested a modification
of the dissolution of marriage agreement. The wife served a sub-
poena duces tecum requesting the production of all his corporate
and personal financial records. The husband, seeking to quash the
subpoena and to obtain a protective order, contended that the re-
quest was too broad and indefinite-that relevancy was not shown.
The trial court denied the husband's motion and the Second Dis-
trict affirmed. The matter was one for the discretion of the trial
court judge, and under the facts as presented, that discretion was
not abused.' 4
While the discovery of books and records may be relevant to
proceedings involving financial determinations such as an account-
ing, a right to the accounting must be established prior to permit-
ting discovery of certain items.' 5 Thus, interrogatories relevant only
"to the amount of any sums that might be due the plaintiff in any
accounting and not to the issue of the plaintiff's right to an account-
ing," must be deferred.' 8 Likewise, books of account, income tax
records, cancelled checks and correspondence related thereto are
not discoverable until the issue of a right to the accounting is deter-
mined.'87
1. WORK PRODUCT
In Reynolds v. Hofmann,'8 both parties attended a meeting in
anticipation of litigation. Certain witnesses in the cause were pres-
ent and plaintiff taped this meeting after informing those present
of his intention to do so. In pre-trial discovery the plaintiff, himself
an attorney, was requested to produce the tape. He refused, con-
tending that the tape was work product and therefore privileged
from discovery. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, found
that the tape did not fall within the work product classification.
184. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 298 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974). The court stated that the
record did not contain the transcripts of the hearings below and therefore a determination of
whether the information was relevant could not be made. In such a case, the court had to
affirm unless a clear abuse of discretion was shown.
185. Charles Sales Corp. v. Rovenger, 88 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1956).
186. G. H. Crawford Co. Fin. Serv. v. Goch, 292 So. 2d 54, 55 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974)
(emphasis added).
187. David v. Tansill, 297 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
188. 305 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). For certain additional facts of this case (men-
tioned in the survey), see Brief for Petitioner at A-i, Reynolds v. Hoffman, 305 So. 2d 294
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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Although the court's decision appears correct, its rationale is less
than persuasive. The court noted that the purpose of discovery is
to promote the process of getting relevant and pertinent evidence
before the court. This should not have been a basis for decision
however, since most work product is relevant and pertinent but
nonetheless privileged. A second, more compelling reason for its
decision was that rule 1.280(b)(2) allows a party to discover a state-
ment previously made by himself, including one recorded on tape.
But this does not justify discovery of the entire tape as was permit-
ted here. The court further reasoned that the tape did not fall within
the generally recognized work product categories of an attorney's
mental impressions, personal notes and records as to witnesses, or
conclusions or legal theories." 9 However, from the facts presented in
its opinion, it appears that the tape could easily be considered a
record as to a witness but not a personal, or private, one. 9 '
The court did not elaborate whether its decision was based on
this distinction. Perhaps the most critical factor, which the court
did not discuss, was that both parties were present at the meeting.
This is significant because there was no need to protect plaintiff's
"work product" as it had already been disclosed. The privilege, if
it existed, could be considered waived.
2. PRIVILEGED REPORTS
It appears that the Third District will follow those cases 9'
which hold as privileged, reports required to be filed by statute.
Under Florida Statutes section 648.39(3) (1973) an insurer must file
a written notice of termination of the appointment of a limited
surety agent. This record is privileged and not discoverable. 9"
189. The court listed the following specific items:
[P]ersonal views of an attorney as to how and when to present evidence, his
evaluation of its importance, his knowledge of which witness will give certain
testimony, personal notes and records as to witnesses, jurors, legal citations,
proposed arguments, jury instructions, diagrams and charts he may refer to at
trial for his convenience, but not to be used as evidence.
305 So. 2d at 295, citing Surf Drugs, Inc. v. Vermette, 236 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1970).
190. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
191. See Fogarty Bros. Transfer Co. v. Perkins, 250 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971)
(federal agency requiring the filing of accident reports). See also Sligar v. Tucker, 267 So. 2d
54 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972) (hospital reports for the benefit of insurers).
192. Getter v. Yanks, 290 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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B. Discovery Devices
1. INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES
Rule 1.340 delineates the procedure for use of interrogatories.
Like other discovery devices, they may be used to inquire into mat-
ters relevant to the proceedings. County of Volusia v. Union Camp
Corp. 93 was a tax assessment action. Union Camp purchased prop-
erty and sought to retain the land's classification as agricultural for
assessment purposes. However, the county alleged that the com-
pany had conveyed agricultural lands for the purpose of real estate
development to its own subsidiary real estate development corpora-
tion. In determining whether the property should retain its agricul-
tural classification, the First District held that the following interro-
gations filed by the county and the Department of Revenue were
relevant: inquiry as to the relationship between the corporations,
the prior history of land transactions between the companies in the
subject county, and the nature of any dealings between the compa-
nies in acquiring the property in question. 9' Union Camp's purpose
for using the land was relevant as preferential tax treatment would
not be extended to land which was obviously not purchased
primarily for agricultural purposes.
2. DEPOSITIONS
Although rule 1.310(c) provides that depositions of witnesses
may proceed as permitted at the trial, this does not mean that a
deposition must proceed in accordance with trial rules. Leading
questions may be asked"5 to which objections may be raised but
such questions must be answered.' Applicable to the situation in
which a party becomes overzealous in the pursuit of information,
rule 1.310(d) provides for orders limiting the scope and manner of
taking depositions.
Rule 1.330 provides for the use of depositions in court proceed-
ings. Subsection (a)(3) of the rule provides that if a witness is dead,
his deposition may be used for any purpose. Yet, Florida Statutes
section 90.05 (1973) provides that no person shall be examined as a
193. 302 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
194. In relation to this last inquiry the court also held that a request for production of
correspondence and reports or studies between the companies as to the possible ultimate
disposition of the property was relevant.
195. Jones v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 297 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
196. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(c).
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witness in regard to any transaction between himself and a person
deceased at the time of the examination. The District Court of
Appeal, Third District, has held that a deposition taken of a person
prior to his demise is admissible into evidence.'97 The dissent would
have limited the use of these depositions because the material cov-
ered was only that which the deposing attorney wanted. Also, the
"dead man's" statute should have been applicable unless the de-
ceased had conceded a cause of action as revealed in the deposition.
Therefore, the court's first task should have been to determine if the
deceased waived the statute by his statements.'98
Rule 1.330(a)(2) allows the deposition of a party to be used by
an adverse party for any purpose. In Rothschild v. De Gaspari,'" the
court was confronted with the issue of whether an incomplete depo-
sition was a "deposition of a party" within the rule. Plaintiff De
Gaspari's deposition was only partially taken by defendant's coun-
sel. Acting on his counsel's advice, he left before the deposition
could be completed. Allegedly, defendant's counsel harassed and
aggravated De Gaspari during the deposition proceedings. Subse-
quently, the reporter certified and later filed the partially completed
deposition. During the trial the defendant attempted to use the
deposition to impeach De Gaspari. The trial court denied such use
holding that it did not qualify as a deposition of a party since it had
not been verified in accordance with rule 1.310(e). °° On appeal, the
Third District reversed and held that rule 1.330(d)(4) required that
the plaintiff file a motion to suppress the deposition with reasonable
promptness after the verification defect was discovered or his objec-
tions would be waived. Under the facts of the instant case, reason-
able promptness, according to the court, would have been when
notice was received that the deposition had been filed.
As to the allegations of bad faith and harassment, the court
noted that the plaintiff could have availed himself of the protection
of rule 1.310(d) by moving in court for an order limiting or ending
the deposition proceedings. Since this was not pursued, the reporter
197. Cohen v. Glickman, 300 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
198. Id. at 320 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
199. 287 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
200. Rule 1.310(e) presently provides:
the deposition shall be submitted to the witness for examination . . . . Any
changes that the witness desires to make shall be entered . . . [separately and
attached] to the deposition and it shall then be signed by the witness . . .
[unless signing is waived by stipulation of the parties] or . . . [the witness]
cannot be found or refuses to sign . . . [in which case] the officer shall sign it
. . . and the deposition may then be used as fully as though signed . ...
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taking the deposition properly certified and filed it.2"' However, not
every improperly taken or improperly filed deposition can be vali-
dated by a failure to file a motion to suppress. The court's holding
is limited to situations where an incomplete deposition is certified
and filed by the officer taking it. 2
3. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
Rule 1.350(a) allows any party to request that another party
produce designated documents in his possession or control for
inspection and copying. However, a party cannot request that a
statement of his opponent's "net worth" be produced where there
was no showing that the statement existed or was in his posses-
sion .201
Rule 1.350(b) 214 provides that a request for production upon any
party not a plaintiff may be made without leave of court with or
after service of process and the initial pleading upon that party. A
party so served has 30 days within which to state that he will comply
or to state his reasons for objecting. Rule 1.310 provides, with cer-
tain exceptions, that a plaintiff must obtain leave of court if he
seeks to take a deposition within 30 days of service. In Bergin v.
Bergin205 the plaintiff served a request for production with a notice
to take a deposition. The deposition was scheduled for a time within
30 days of service and production of documents was to accompany
the taking of the deposition. The plaintiff contended that rule
1.350(b) required the defendant to produce at that time. The court,
however, held that without a court order or a subpoena, production
cannot be compelled at a deposition scheduled within 30 days of
service. It is not discernable from the court's opinion whether the
deposition itself was scheduled with leave of court as rule 1.310
requires for depositions within 30 days of service. However, since
rule 1.310 is mandatory it probably was with leave of court. There-
fore, it appears that a party seeking production within the 30-day
period must request that the order for taking the deposition also
specifically authorize production of documents.
201. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(f)(1).
202. Rothschild v. De Gaspari, 287 So. 2d 341, 343 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
203. Balzebre v. Anderson, 294 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
204. Without leave of court the request [for production of documents] may
be served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any other
party with or after service of the process and initial pleading upon that party.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.350(b).
205. 292 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); accord, Lytton v. Lytton, 289 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1974).
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4. REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
Like other forms of discovery, admissions help to narrow the
issues. In Polonsky v. Polonsky,1°1 a husband moved to set aside a
final judgment of dissolution of marriage on the grounds that the
judgment was void. 07 He alleged that his wife had not met the 6-
month residency requirement for plaintiffs seeking dissolution
under Florida Statutes section 61.021 (1973). Pursuant to this mo-
tion, the husband sought admissions from the wife as to her resi-
dency during the particular dates in question. The wife objected on
the grounds that his claim had already been adjudicated. The
Fourth District held that the wife could not refuse the admissions
on those grounds. As long as discovery can narrow the issues and
reach matters reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence,
it should be allowed.
C. Refusal to Acquiesce in Discovery
In order to insure that the discovery rules will function effec-
tively, rule 1.380 provides for sanctions against persons who would
obstruct the discovery process. If a party refuses to submit to a
mental or physical examination pursuant to rule 1.380(b), the court
may, among other things, order that the opposing party's facts be
taken as established, that the refusing party cannot assert his
claims or defenses, or that the pleadings of the refusing party be
stricken .20
In a case involving dissolution of marriage, the wife, who was
not presently self-supporting, refused to submit to a physical exami-
nation to determine her ability to support herself.00 The court
struck the wife's claim for support and alimony even though a
physical examination would have related only to her claim for sup-
port. The wife then filed a motion with the trial court to vacate that
order based on her subsequent willingness to submit to the examina-
tion. This motion was denied. The District Court of Appeal, Third
District, reversed. The objective of the sanction portion of the dis-
covery rules is compliance and should be invoked "only after...
the defaulting party . . . [has had] a reasonable opportunity to
206. 303 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
207. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b).
208. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)(2).
209. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 284 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). The wife alleged that
she was unable to work due to poor health and loss of weight.
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conform after originally failing or even refusing to appear . . ,210
The court further stated that rather than dismiss, a more proper
sanction would have been to bar the wife from presenting evidence
on the status of her health or to order the condition of her health as
established by the respondent's contentions.
If a motion compelling discovery is granted, rule 1.380(a)(4)
provides that the party whose conduct necessitated the order shall
be made to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses in-
curred, including attorneys' fees, unless circumstances mitigate
against such award. Where the record on appeal is vague as to why
the trial court refused to impose expenses although a motion to
compel discovery had been granted, the trial court decision will be
affirmed because its order is presumed correct.2
VII. DISMISSAL
A. Voluntary
A distinction between the Florida and federal rules on volun-
tary dismissals helps to focus on a problem currently encountered
in Florida courts. Federal rule 41 limits a party's right to request *a
voluntary dismissal to the period before the service of an answer or
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, whichever
comes earlier. Florida rule 1.420(a) is more liberal. An action may
be voluntarily dismissed at any time before a hearing on a motion
for a summary judgment or before retirement of the jury or before
the submission of a non-jury case to the court for decision. A recent
case points out how this more liberal rule can be used to defeat,
rather than promote, justice.
DeMaupassant v. Evans2 2 involved an action to recover for
personal injuries which the plaintiff had sustained as a passenger
in a taxicab which collided with another vehicle. He sued the cab
driver, the cab company, the other driver and the other driver's
insurance company. During closing arguments, counsel for the de-
fendant cab company and the plaintiff placed the fault on the other
driver. Plaintiff's counsel then took a voluntary dismissal as to the
defendant cab driver and cab company as allowed by the
combination of rules 1.420(a) and 1.250(b). 11 Since the rules permit
210. Id. at 227, quoting Hurley v. Werly, 203 So. 2d 530, 537 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
211. Rankin v. Rankin, 284 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
212. 300 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
213. Rule 1.250(b) allows a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss parties in accordance with
rule 1.420(a).
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this tactic to be employed, the First District, on appeal, found no
error. However, the following admonition of the court is worth not-
ing:
[W]e do think that this case raises an issue which should be
considered by the Supreme Court of Florida when it next under-
takes a revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure ....
[W]e feel that the rule [rule 1.420] should be changed to pre-
vent voluntary dismissals, without order of court, of co-defen-
dants at the end of a trial after they have had an opportunity to
"heap it on" the remaining defendant or defendants."'
Another aspect of rule 1.420(a) is that a second voluntary dis-
missal in an action based on or including the same claim operates
as an adjudication on the merits. But this "two dismissal" rule does
not include voluntary dismissals granted by leave of court."' In
Dave Hess, Inc. v. Black Angus, Inc. ,'" the plaintiff announced his
intention to take a voluntary dismissal, and subsequently the court,
although not compelled to so act, issued a judgment dismissing the
action. This counted as one of the dismissals under the "two dis-
missal" rule because the order dismissing the action "only con-
firmed what the appellant had already accomplished under the
rule." 7 Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a second voluntary dis-
missal on all claims as to some defendants and some claims as to
other defendants. Although the trial court held that this second
dismissal was an adjudication on the merits, the Fourth District,
noting that the rule is addressed to dismissals of actions prior to the
filing of a responsive pleading by the opposing party, held that
"such filing was insufficient to permit the circuit court to apply the
two dismissal rule to appellant, because that notice [of the second
dismissal] did not involve all the defendants in the action."2', Thus,
in Florida, a reading of DeMaupassant and Dave Hess together
could allow a plaintiff, at his convenience, to take voluntary dis-
missals as to fewer than all parties as many times as he wishes.
The procedure for effecting a voluntary dismissal requires only
that the plaintiff indicate to the court that such action is being
taken. The court's approval is not required. Accordingly, a plaintiff
cannot complain that he was denied his right to a voluntary dis-
214. 300 So. 2d at 314.
215. Crump v. Gold House Restaurants, Inc., 96 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1957).
216. 288 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
217. Id. at 287.
218. Id.
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missal when his request for either a mistrial or a nonsuit was denied.
He could have taken the nonsuit as of right."9
For purposes of Florida Statutes section 713.29 (1973), which
provides for an award of attorneys' fees to the "prevailing party" in
actions to enforce liens, when one party takes a voluntary dismissal
the opposing party is deemed to have prevailed even though neither
party wins or loses when a voluntary dismissal is taken.22
B. Involuntary
In a non-jury case a defending party can move under rule
1.420(b) to dismiss on the grounds that the party seeking affirma-
tive relief, given the facts and law, has not made a case.2 ' In Ak-
douruk v. Advanced Jet Systems, Inc.,222 the defendant moved to
dismiss at the conclusion of plaintiff's opening statement alleging
that the contract upon which plaintiff was suing did not support his
cause of action. The motion was granted by the trial court with
prejudice. However, the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
reversed on the basis that rule 1.420(b) requires that a party be
given an opportunity to present all the evidence in support of his
side. The court commented that the defendant could have moved
to dismiss during the pleading stage and then the plaintiff would
have been able to amend his complaint to conform to the contract.
The effect of the court's dismissing the cause after the plaintiff's
opening statement was to "preclude either the amendment of the
complaint or the introduction of evidence to explain the discrep-
ancy." 23
When in doubt, parties should request that a court designate
whether its dismissal is with or without prejudice. In one case 2 1 the
trial court dismissed the defendant's third party complaint. There
was no provision for leave to amend, however, the dismissal was not
with prejudice. When the defendant filed an amended third party
complaint, it was dismissed as "out of order." The Third District
affirmed, holding that the first dismissal was a final adjudication
on the merits. When the court does not designate whether the dis-
missal is with or without prejudice, the dismissal operates as an
219. Tate v. Gray, 292 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
220. Jackson v. Hatch, 288 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
221. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b).
222. 296 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
223. Id. at 657; see FiA. R. Civ. P. 1.480 (jury trials).
224. Maude Indus., Inc. v. MacDonald Eng'r Co., 296 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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adjudication on the merits.2"' Since it is on the merits or with preju-
dice, res judicata would apply in subsequent actions and the court's
jurisdiction would end.
C. Failure to Prosecute
Compared to an involuntary dismissal which is with prejudice,
a dismissal for failure to prosecute under rule 1.420(e) is without
prejudice" unless special circumstances are shown.2 7 The rule is
further distinguished from other forms of dismissal in that if lack
of prosecution within the year is demonstrated by the facts, and a
motion to dismiss on this ground is made, the action "shall be
dismissed . . . unless a party shows good cause in writing why the
action should remain pending at least five days before the hearing
on the motion.2 28
In Koppers Co. v. Victoire Development Corp. ,29 the Supreme
Court of Florida held that this language in the rule is mandatory
and not permissive if the judge finds lack of prosecution. In
Koppers, the plaintiff had filed a complaint in October of 1968 but
never had served process on the defendant. A co-defendant cross-
claimed against the defendant on July 12, 1971, but no action by
either party was taken in the main suit. In September 1971 the
defendant moved to dismiss the original complaint pursuant to rule
1.420(e) because more than a year had elapsed since the plaintiff's
filing. The filing of the cross-claim did not satisfy the "activity"
requirement of the rule. The trial judge ordered dismissal unless the
plaintiff obtained service within 20 days. This conditional order was
contested by the defendant to the Fourth District, which affirmed.23
The supreme court reversed. The trial court had no discretion to
grant an extension because the rule is mandatory if no good cause
had been shown why the action should have remained pending.2 31
A trial court may, upon its own motion, schedule a hearing on
225. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b).
226. Gibbs v. Trudeau, 283 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
227. Nicholson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 285 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). The court failed
to specify what the circumstances were. See Golinvauz v. Bill Bower Friendly Ford, 303 So.
2d 406 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). In Golinuauz the court, without mentioning rule 1.420(e), held
that failure by the plaintiff to respond to repeated notices of hearings on the motions to
dismiss without adequate excuse warranted dismissal with prejudice.
228. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e) (emphasis added).
229. 284 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1973).
230. Koppers Co. v. Victoire Devel. Corp., 261 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), rev'd,
284 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1973).
231. Accord, Reddish v. Forlines, 207 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
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whether a cause should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. In Barr
v. Ehrlich,132 the parties were notified of such a hearing but it was
never conducted and no adjudication was made on whether the case
should have been dismissed. Instead, there was a trial on the merits
in which the plaintiff prevailed. The defendant appealed on the
grounds that the court failed to rule on its own motion. The Fourth
District agreed with the defendant that "the machinery under the
mentioned rule having been cranked up, the parties were entitled
to an adjudication .... ,,,33 Either the cause should have been
dismissed or the court should have found good cause why the case
should remain pending. The case was then remanded for a ruling
on the undisposed motion.
On remand the circuit court made certain findings to justify
denying the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's counsel, upon receiving
notice of the hearing scheduled by the court, spoke with the defense
counsel and was informed that the latter would not object to a
cancellation of the hearing. Further, plaintiff's counsel obtained
assurances from the court that an order of dismissal would not be
entered. Neither party appeared at the hearing, no hearing was
held, and no order was entered. Prior to the commencement of the
trial, the judge in his chambers asked the defense counsel if there
were any problems with proceeding on the merits, but the attorney
indicated his willingness to begin since apparently he believed that
plaintiff's action was unenforceable. The Fourth District affirmed
the denial of defendant's motion on the ground that the case had
been tried on its "merits to partial final judgment without appropri-
ate objection or preservation of error on the part of defendant's
counsel. '2 3' The court, by way of dictum, stated that all pending
motions should be disposed of by order, prior to trial, and if a court
intends to withdraw its 1.420(e) motion, it is an act of discretion
subject to review.
At first glance this decision may seem difficult to reconcile with
the supreme court's holding in Koppers that rule 1.420(e) is manda-
tory once its conditions are met. However, a recent district court of
appeal decision helps eliminate any confusion. In Fields v. Fields,235
the First District held that in order to dismiss a case pursuant to
rule 1.420(e), a court must hold a hearing on dismissal. Where the
232. 301 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
233. Barr v. Ehrlich, 295 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
234. 301 So. 2d at 148.
235. 291 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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court files notice of an intention to dismiss but holds no hearing, the
parties may continue to file pleadings, take depositions and rely on
the inaction of the court as indicating no dismissal will occur.
Thus, the general rule in Florida under Koppers, Fields, and
Barr appears to be that if a court files a motion to dismiss but
nothing more, the parties can continue with pretrial proceedings.
Furthermore, it is before trial that the motion must be disposed of.
But, if a hearing is held and lack of prosecution is found to exist,
the action must be dismissed.
In considering whether there has been any "action" within the
1-year period, the rule contemplates that the activity involves con-
tact with the opposing party or the court."' "[Nion record activity
which moves the case toward ultimate resolution is sufficient 'pros-
ecution' under the rule;" thus, sending a medical report to opposing
counsel by mail upon his request satisfies the rule."' There is, how-
ever, no contact when a notice of taking a deposition is filed but no
deposition is subsequently taken. 3
An interesting case involving the question of "action" was that
of Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Capellia.339 In Crouse-Hinds, the action was
brought against two defendants, one of whom was a foreign corpora-
tion not authorized to do business in Florida. After trying several
times to obtain jurisdiction over the foreign corporation through
long arm statutes, 4 " the plaintiff proceeded against the other de-
fendant. Nearly two years after the last complaint had been filed
against the foreign corporation,24 ' it moved for a 1.420(e) dismissal
for failure to prosecute without being served; it may have wanted
to clear the record against it. The motion was granted even though
there was action against the other defendant during this period.
This case is to be distinguished from a situation where the plaintiff
has obtained jurisdiction over both defendants but there is action
with respect to only one.242 In such a case, dismissal will not be
granted as to either defendant, since activity against one defendant
236. Wells v. Van Arnam, 271 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
237. Eddings v. Davidson, 302 So. 2d 155, 157 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974); Leverenz v.
Schmieder, 294 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); see Musselman Steel Fabricators, Inc. v.
Radziwon, 263 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1972) (mailing of photographic copies of exhibits marked for
identification during a deposition).
238. Castle v. Struhl, 293 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
239. 302 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
240. FLA. STAT. §§ 48.181, .193 (1973).
241. Plaintiff had twice amended his original complaint-the last amendment being 20
months prior to the motion to dismiss.
242. Eastern Elevator, Inc. v. Page, 250 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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precludes the other from obtaining a motion to dismiss for failure
to prosecute."'
VIII. DIRECTED VERDICTS
A verdict should not be directed for a party pursuant to rule
1.480 unless no evidence presented could in law support a verdict
for the opposing party.244 Thus, where conflicting conclusions can be
drawn from the evidence, a directed verdict will be reversed.245
Rule 1.480(b) provides that "[w]ithin ten days after the recep-
tion of a verdict a party who has moved for a directed verdict may
move . . . to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion
.... ." The Supreme Court of Florida has held that where a party
served his motion on opposing counsel on the tenth day after the
verdict but did not file with the clerk until 2 days later the 10
day period of the rule was satisfied.24 The court noted that service
was the crucial factor because the purpose of the requirement is to
notify the parties. 47
In Carmichael v. Shelley Tractor & Equipment Co.,24 the
Fourth District has held that rule 1.480(a) motions for directed
verdict can only be made at the close of the evidence offered by the
adverse party although the rule is couched in less demonstrative
terms. The plaintiff brought an action for breach of a contract to
deliver and service equipment. In a counterclaim the defendant
alleged that the plaintiff failed to make payments in accord with the
contract provisions. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his com-
plaint and moved to amend his answer to the defendant's counter-
claim to include allegations that the defendant had not performed
243. Crouse-Hinds gives the reasons for the distinction between the two cases. The
jurisdiction acquired in Page allowed action taken by one of the two defendants to be viewed
as a positive step toward bringing the suit to judgment. Further adjudication of the suit was
not possible as to Crouse-Hinds since the court never did get jurisdiction over the second
defendant.
244. Strahm v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 285 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); accord, Lehrer
v. Fontainebleu Hotel Corp., 285 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); Lustig v. Feinberg, 285 So.
2d 631 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). In a "slip and fall" case a directed verdict should never be granted
unless all the evidence as taken with a view most favorable to the adverse party could not
support a verdict by the jury. Marlowe v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 284 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1973); cf. Clemente v. Tundidor, 284 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973) (undisputed evidence
showed plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law, thus a verdict was directed
against the plaintiff).
245. Vertomen v. Williams, 287 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
246. Behm v. Division of Administration, Dept. of Transp., 288 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1974).
247. Id. at 478, citing Miami Transit Co. v. Ford, 155 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1963).
248. 300 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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his contract obligations. This motion was denied and before the
original plaintiff presented his case on the counterclaim, a directed
verdict was entered for the defendant. This decision was reversed
on two grounds. The Fourth District held it was an abuse of discre-
tion not to allow the plaintiffs amendment to his answer which was
"nothing more than the substance of . . . [his] voluntarily dis-
missed complaint . "...249 No surprise or prejudice to the de-
fendant would result by such an amendment as the issue of breach
of contract was included in the pretrial order. Secondly, the
defendant's motion for directed verdict was premature. The court
emphasized that rule 1.480(a) requires that a directed verdict not
be granted prior to the time that the plaintiff has presented his
case.
250
IX. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
"The purpose of a default judgment is to prevent a defendant
from employing dilatory tactics during the pendency of a case; it is
not intended to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of contesting his
claim against the defendant . "... 2' Where delay is evidenced by
a failure to file or serve any paper in the action, rule 1.500(a) allows
the clerk of the court to enter a default against the party engaging
in the dilatory tactics. In Mo-Con Properties, Inc. v. American Me-
chanical, Inc. ,'52 the defendant served opposing counsel by mail with
a copy of a motion within the time allowed and mailed the original
simultaneously to the clerk for filing. However, the original did not
arrive at the clerk's office until the following day in the late after-
noon. By that time, the plaintiff had been granted his motion for a
default by the clerk and final judgment had been entered thereon.
The trial court denied the defendant's rule 1.540(b) motion to va-
cate. 253 On appeal, the Fourth District reversed. The defendant had
properly served a paper within the time allowed; therefore, the entry
of the default by the clerk was erroneous. 54 In a similar case it was
249. Id. at 299.
250. See Akdoruk v. Advanced Jet Sys., Inc., 296 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), dis-
cussed in section VII, B supra.
251. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Publisher's Vending Serv., Inc., 296
So. 2d 570, 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
252. 289 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
253. Rule 1.500(d) allows the court to set aside a mere default and also provides that if
final judgment has been entered thereon, it may be set aside in accordance with rule 1.540(b).
254. Although the defendant's motion to vacate did not assert a meritorious defense to
the suit, the Fourth District held that this was not fatal.
[Tihe default was not entered due to defendant's failure to comply with the
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held to be an abuse of discretion not to vacate a judgment where
pursuant to rule 1.080(b) service was mailed to opposing counsel
prior to the entry of the default but after the time specified for
responsive pleading.255 Thus, a party can reply at any time before
default is entered.
In Metcalf v. Langston,25 a default was entered in favor of the
plaintiff. The defendant moved pursuant to rule 1.540 to set the
default aside apparently on the basis of excusable neglect. He al-
leged that the plaintiff's complaint and summons were delayed tem-
porarily while being channelled through defendant's offices and that
the defendant had a valid defense to plaintiffs claim. Thus, the
motion met the tests for setting aside a default-it alleged a merito-
rious defense to the claim and a willingness to proceed to trial. 57
However, defendant's motion was signed only by his attorney,"'8 was
not under oath, and was not accompanied by an affidavit or other
proof of its contents. The District Court of Appeal, First District,
held that the trial judge did not err in denying the motion to vacate
the default; although rule 1.030 states that "pleadings" need not be
verified or accompanied by an affidavit, "[i]f affirmative relief is
desired then it is necessary that proof be adduced.""2 ' Thus, at least
in the First District, rule 1.540 motions generally should be
accompanied by affidavit. The court did note that other methods
of proof may be acceptable: by sworn statement of counsel with
actual knowledge of the facts, by deposition, or by live testimony
in court. Proof is not necessary, however, if the parties stipulate to
the allegations or the allegations are admitted by opposing counsel.
Once a default has been entered against the defendant and his
motion to vacate is denied, he is, of course, deprived of his right to
contest the existence of the plaintiff's claims and his own liability.
However, when the cause proceeds to trial, the defendant is not
deprived of his "right to contest the amount of damages by way of
rules, but was entered erroneously by the clerk at a time when the defendant had,
in fact, served a paper in the cause.
289 So. 2d at 745.
255. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Publisher's Vending Serv., Inc., 296
So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). Rule 1.500(c) allows a party to plead at any time before default
is entered.
256. 296 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
257. Id., citing North Shore Hosp. Inc. v. Barber, 143 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1962).
258. Signature by counsel only signifies that to the best of his knowledge, there are good
grounds to support the allegations-it does not import the truthfulness of the facts alleged
therein. Id. at 85.
259. Id.
19751
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the introduction of evidence in mitigation of them or by cross-
examination. '" ' 60
X. SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
A. In General
A summary judgment should only be granted where there is no
dispute as to genuine issues of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.26' When a party moves
for summary judgment he concedes that there is no genuine issue
of material fact only for the purpose of his motion. Thus, where
genuine issues of material fact are shown to exist, the fact that both
parties filed motions for summary judgment does not eliminate such
factual issues. The motions should be denied and the issues tried. 62
When considering a motion for summary judgment by one
party, a court may order summary judgment for the opposing party
or, the opposing party may move for one in his favor.6 3 Therefore,
a moving party should be prepared to contest summary judgment
in favor of the opposing party. In Jockey Club, Inc. v. Blake,"4 the
plaintiff moved for a "summary judgment on the pleadings." Since
the rules do not provide for such a motion, it was treated as one for
summary judgment by the trial court. The court then granted the
defendant's ore tenus motion for summary judgment. On appeal,
the plaintiff insisted that his motion was merely for a judgment on
the pleadings 6' and therefore he was unprepared to contest the sum-
mary judgment granted in the defendant's favor. The Third District
considered this rationale and held that in light of the plaintiff's
260. Robbins v. Thompson, 291 So. 2d 225, 226 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
261. Frank v. Pepin, 283 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). During the survey period there
were a number of cases involving the question of whether an issue of fact existed. E.g., Wood
v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973) (whether a party is an invitee, licensee or trespasser may
be an issue of fact); Armstrong v. Pet Memorials, Inc., 301 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974)
(failure to attach contract to complaint raises issue of fact); City of Hallandale v. State ex
rel. Sage Corp., 298 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974) (affirmative defenses asserted in defend-
ant's answer raise issue of fact unless conclusively refuted by plaintiff); Claudio v. Miami
Aerospace Academy, Inc., 291 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974) (issue of fact where only evidence
before the court was plaintiff's deposition which was not conclusive that no issues existed;
Florida E.C. Ry. v. City of Hallandale, 288 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974) (issue whether
property in question was part of a right-of-way); City of St. Petersburg v. Naden, 284 So. 2d
15 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973) (negligence); Northside Motors v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973)
(liability for conversion).
262. Francis v. General Motors Corp., 287 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
263. Carpineta v. Shields, 70 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1954).
264. 297 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
265. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(c). The plaintiff only contemplated a ruling on the suffi-
ciency of defendant's answer in defense of the complaint.
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contention that his was not a motion for summary judgment he
should be given an opportunity to defend against the defendant's
motion.
Although a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, it
is not always grounds for the granting of a summary judgment. In
Mount Sinai Hospital, Inc. v. Cordis Corp.,2"' the hospital's action
against a cardiovascular instruments manufacturer was for an ac-
counting, for a declaratory judgment as to its rights in the subject
"pacemaker" and for injunctive relief. A summary judgment was
granted by the trial court in the defendant's favor based on the
statute of limitations. The District Court of Appeal, Third District,
reversed because the plaintiff's equitable rights under the principle
of laches were defeated by granting the motion. The court also ques-
tioned the validity of the statute of limitations defense. 67
The Fourth District has shown that a court should broaden its
scope of inquiry on summary judgment where obvious defenses are
present. In Ivey Plants, Inc. v. FMC Corp. ,"'s the parties had entered
into a lease of equipment which contained an exculpatory clause for
damages from personal or property injury and an indemnity clause
to the benefit of the defendant. Plaintiff-lessee sought to recover for
damages caused by a fire to its property which allegedly resulted
from defendant-lessor's breach of contract and negligent mainte-
nance of the equipment. The trial court entered a summary judg-
ment for defendant finding no genuine issue of material fact due to
the limitation of liability and indemnity provisions of the lease. The
Fourth District reversed, holding that a summary judgment for the
defendant was improper. This exculpatory clause did not defeat a
right to sue for breach of contract. Furthermore, exculpatory clauses
can be challenged as unconscionable, which challenge requires a
consideration of the relative bargaining positions of the contracting
parties-an issue of fact to be determined by a jury. Also, the in-
demnification clause lacked the required specific language to "au-
thorize indemnification for negligence committed by the indemnitee
alone.""
Rule 1.510(d) provides that the court shall, upon motion for
summary judgment, ascertain material facts not in substantial con-
266. 285 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
267. The statute of limitations may not have been available because the hospital could
assert a contract action based on a continuing obligation. There may have been partial
payment of a debt, tolling the running of the statute. Also, a material issue of fact existed
whether the defendant was estopped from asserting the defense. Id. at 647.
268. 282 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
269. Id. at 209.
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troversy and other relief not in issue and make an order so that at
the trial or final hearing these matters will be clearly established.
The order constitutes a partial summary judgment and is proper
although questions of material fact remain as to other issues not
covered by the order. 7' However, the purpose of the order is only to
simplify the final hearing and therefore it is error to grant a partial
final summary judgment. There should be only one judgment-the
order entered being only interlocutory in nature. 7'
B. Sufficiency of Affidavits
A motion for summary judgment may be accompanied by sup-
porting affidavits. The affidavits should set forth facts that would
be admissible into evidence at trial; 72 therefore, a statement which
is merely a conclusion of law does not qualify.273 However, where the
facts stated in an affidavit are admissible and sufficient to prove a
defense, a motion for summary judgment will be granted if the
plaintiff fails to bring before the court sufficient proof to raise the
existence of material issues of fact. 74
XI. JURY TRIAL
Under modern pleading, equitable and legal claims can be
brought in a single action.2 75 Where such issues are joined, the right
to trial by jury of the legal issues must be given effect. However, if
a trial on the equitable issues would be collateral estoppel or res
judicata foreclosing a hearing of the legal issues and thereby depriv-
ing the party of his right to jury trial on those issues, a court ought
to try the jury issues first. 71 In Westview Community Cemetery v.
Lewis2'7 the defendant asserted a counter-claim to quiet title to
property and to eject the tenant who claimed he was the owner of
the property. Since the factual determinations of the equitable
claim to quiet title were so similar to those of the legal ejectment
claim, the right to a jury trial on the latter issue would be effectively
foreclosed by a trial of the former issue. Although the court could
270. Tiffany Realty, Inc. v. Alvin, 286 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
271. Pointer Oil Co. v. Butler Aviation, Inc., 293 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
272. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e).
273. Stringfellow v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 295 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
274. Moore v. Maschmann, 296 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
275. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.040, 1.110(g). Legal and equitable issues can also be severed
in accordance with rule 1.270(b). Commodore Plaza at Century 21 Condominium Ass'n v.
Century 21 Commodore Plaza, Inc., 290 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
276. See Westview Community Cemetery v. Lewis, 293 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
277. Id.
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have tried the legal claim first, it chose instead to order a trial by
jury on all the issues.
Although the historical separation of equity and law may have
prevented the awarding of punitive damages in an action seeking
both legal and equitable relief, " ' the Fourth District has adopted a
more enlightened view by allowing "a judge who sits as the trier of
fact in a case involving both legal and equitable claims . .. [t]o
award both compensatory and punitive damages, where appropri-
ate, as well as any appropriate equitable relief.""'
It is generally recognized that the right to trial by jury cannot
be lost as to legal issues where those issues are characterized as
incidental to equitable issues.8 0 In a questionable decision, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Third District, refused to require a trial court
to grant a jury trial in circumstances where the legal claim appeared
to be incidental. In Vivian Greene, Inc. v. Levine,"s' the plaintiff
brought an action for a breach of an oral contract to convey stock
in return for cash and services. Plaintiff requested relief in the form
of damages and equitable relief in the form of a mandatory injunc-
tion compelling issuance of the stock to him, an injunction to stop
mismanagement and an accounting. The defendant denied
plaintiff's allegations and demanded a jury trial on the issues of
plaintiff's claim of entitlement to the stock ownership based on the
alleged oral contract. In support of his demand, the defendant noted
that the court had scheduled to try the contract issue prior to the
other issues as to accounting, etc. The Third District, however,
agreed with the denial of jury trial by the trial court and held: "In
a case of this kind a party is not entitled as of right to have an issue
tried by a jury. The matter is one resting in the discretion of the
court." '82 Since a ruling denying a jury trial should not be disturbed
unless an abuse of discretion is shown, the party challenging the
ruling has the burden of proof. In this case, no abuse of discretion
had been demonstrated. This reasoning does not square with rule
1.430(b) which provides: "Any party may demand a trial by jury of
any issue triable of right by a jury."
Florida's summary procedure statute, Florida Statutes section
51.011 (1973) provides that a demand for a jury trial under its provi-
278. Glusman v. Lieberman, 285 So. 2d 29, 30-31 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
279. Id. at 31.
280. FiA. R. Civ. P. 1.430 (a)-(b).
281. 287 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
282. Id. at 136, citing Berg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 88 So. 2d 915, 917 (Fla. 1956); St.
Sophia Greek Orthodox Community v. Vamvaks, 213 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); High-
tower v. Bigoney, 145 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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sions must be made not later than five days after the action comes
to issue. Although this conflicts with the time specified in rule
1.430(b),28 3 rule 1.010, which establishes the applicability of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that the statute would
control. However, section 51.011 does not specify when the action
"comes to issue" or how to compute the five day period. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has resolved both these issues. In
Moffett v. MacArthur,"8 ' a section 51.011 proceeding, the defen-
dant's answer was filed on October 4, 1972. At a hearing on October
10, 1972, the defendant moved for a jury trial. The court held that
the action "came to issue" no earlier than October 4 when the defen-
dant filed his answer. Therefore, it appeared that the demand for a
jury trial was untimely because it was made six days after the action
was at issue. However, in computing the five day period the court
applied rule 1.090 which excludes intervening Saturdays and Sun-
days in cases where the period of time allowed is less than seven
days.
A decision within the survey period also considered the manner
of stating damages within the jury's verdict. Rule 1.481 provides
that "when punitive damages are sought, the verdict shall state the
amount of punitive damages separately from the amounts of other
damages awarded." Whether such damages must be separately
stated as to each joint tortfeasor was resolved by a recent case. In
Town of Medley v. Scott," two police officers abused their author-
ity by roughing up the plaintiff while taking him into custody. The
jury's verdict designated $500 as compensatory damages and $5,000
as punitive damages against the defendants. The defendants ap-
pealed and cited as error the rendition of a single verdict for punitive
damages against them as joint tortfeasors. The District Court of
Appeal, Third District, found no error, holding that the defendants'
"objection to the form of the verdict has been waived because of a
failure to object when the trial judge instructed the jury.""28 Even
absent waiver, the rule requires segregation only of punitive dam-
ages from compensatory damages; under the facts of this case, that
requirement had been met.
The procedure for selecting a trial jury is governed by rule
283. This rule provides that a demand for trial by jury on an issue may be made "at any
time after commencement of the action and not later than ten days after the service of the
last pleading directed to such issue."
284. 291 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
285. 285 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
286. Id. at 664.
(Vol. XXX
CIVIL PROCEDURE
1.431. In a clarification of this procedure, rule 1.431(b) has been
expanded. Formerly the rule stated: "The parties have the right to
examine jurors orally on their voir dire." This language was retained
in the new rule,"7 effective October 1, 1973, with the following addi-
tion: "The order in which the parties may examine each juror shall
be determined by the court. The court may ask such questions of
the jurors as it deems necessary, but the right of the parties to
conduct a reasonable examination of each juror orally shall be pre-
served."
Rule 1.431(c) allows a party to challenge a prospective juror
"for cause," if, among other things, the juror has formed or ex-
pressed an opinion on the action or has any bias or prejudice con-
cerning it. The District Court of Appeal, First District, held that
cause had not been demonstrated when a prospective juror, asked
for an opinion, expressed his views during voir dire that he would
give more credit or weight to the expert testimony of a medical
doctor than that of a chiropractor. 88 The court reasoned that the
juror had not had an opportunity to hear either witness testify and
that after hearing such testimony, the juror would then be in-
structed by the judge to use his own general knowledge of such
factors as education and training to determine the believability of
a witness anyway.
A jury's job is not completed until its foreman signs the verdict
it has rendered. When a verdict has not been signed by the foreman
and neither received nor published by the court clerk, it is proper
to allow the jurors to redeliberate their verdict and change a prior
award.289
The age qualification for a juror has been lowered by the legisla-
ture from 21 years to 18 years or older. Furthermore, mothers with
children under 15 years of age shall be exempted from jury duty.290
Exemption from jury duty has also been extended to any practicing
physician granted an exemption by the presiding judge at his discre-
tion. 291
Jurors have been granted protection by the legislature from
dismissal from employment due to service on a jury. An individual
so dismissed may maintain a civil action for compensatory and
punitive damages. 2 2
287. See In re Clarification of Florida Rules of Prac. & Pro., 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1973).
288. Williams v. Nowling, 297 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
289. Glecer v. Fletcher, 299 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
290. Fla. Laws 1975, 75-78, amending FLA. STAT. § 40.01 (1973).
291. FLA. STAT. § 40.08 (Supp. 1974).
292. FLA. STAT. § 40.271 (Supp. 1974).
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XII. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
As a general rule, each party is entitled to have the jury in-
structed upon his theory of the case "where such theory is supported
by competent evidence and the instructions properly requested
. . -'293 A requested instruction becomes especially important if
the issue to be addressed involves an important facet of the case.294
In Sea Ledge Properties, Inc. v. Dodge,295 the plaintiffs requested a
jury instruction that the measure of damages for a breach of a con-
struction contract was the difference between plaintiff's total cost,
including his cost of completion, and the contract price. However,
defendant's counsel in his closing argument suggested that the
plaintiffs should not recover any damages because they sold the
complete building at a profit; although they incurred costs greater
than the contract price, they could now sell the building for an
amount sufficient to recoup those losses. The trial court refused to
give the plaintiffs' requested instruction and the jury found for the
defendant.
The Third District reversed because the omitted instruction
was, in view of defendant's closing argument, crucial to the proper
decision. Although the jury found the defendant not liable, such a
finding "[w]ithout being advised of the proper measure [of dam-
ages] . . . might well have assumed that if plaintiffs made a profit
on the entire project, that should suffice and preclude any recov-
ery. "290
The Supreme Court of Florida recently changed the burden of
proof instruction for reformation of insurance contract cases. Prior
to Allstate Insurance Co. v. Vanater,297 in reformation of insurance
contract cases, the plaintiff's standard of proof was to show his
claim by clear and convincing evidence as established beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court of Florida, in Allstate, found
this dual standard of proof both improper and confusing; thus, the
court overruled prior cases. 28 Such a rule lead to contradictory jury
293. Luster v. Moore, 78 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla. 1955); Holdsworth v. Crews, 129 So. 2d 153
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
294. Mathis v. Adler, 295 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Grant v. Red Lobster Inns of
America, 292 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974), where failure to give a requested instruction
on comparative negligence was reversible error. Ross v. Elaine Powers Figure Salon, 289 So.
2d 740 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974). In Ross, counsel for both parties requested a jury instruction
pursuant to rule 1.470(b) on the issue of agency. This was an important issue and the trial
court was reversed for not granting the requested instruction.
295. 283 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
296. Id. at 57.
297. 297 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1974).
298. Rosenthal v. First Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 371, 77 So. 92 (1917); Fidelity Phenix
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instructions by giving a jury two different standards of
proof-"clear and convincing evidence" and "beyond a reasonable
doubt." Establishing the claim by clear and convincing evidence
has been adopted as the new standard for jury instructions in these
cases.299
In another supreme court decision, Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Fruchter,°° the defendant insurance company had begun disability
payments to the plaintiff. Later, the defendant discontinued the
payments; consequently, the plaintiff sued for their resumption.
Since it is well established, in Florida, that the burden of proving
that the disability had ceased is on the insurance company,",' the
plaintiff requested that the trial court issue a jury instruction to
that effect. However, the court was faced with a conflict. Florida
Standard Jury Instructions 3.7, Comment 2, which was approved
by the supreme court,0 2 recommends that no charge be given to a
jury using the term "burden of proof" because it is an insufficient
standard for use by a jury to determine a verdict."3 Therefore, the
trial court charged the jury in accordance with Florida Standard
Jury Instruction 3.7 which provides that "[i]f the great weight of
the evidence does not support the claim of (claimant), then your
verdict should be for (defendant)." '3 4 The Third District found this
instruction to be in error and the supreme court agreed. Technical
adherence to the Instructions under the facts of this case resulted
in the plaintiff having to prove his continuing disability by the
greater weight of the evidence-a burden which conflicts with prior
law. The problem could have been solved if plaintiff's attorney had
requested an instruction that "the insurance company 'must estab-
lish by the greater weight of the evidence' ,,311 that plaintiff's disabil-
ity had ceased.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Hilliard, 65 Fla. 443, 62 So. 585 (1913); Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Trapani, 118
So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960); Crosby v. International Invest. Co., 101 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1958).
299. 297 So. 2d at 295-96. The court stated that reformation was a "pure" equity matter
whether a jury decided facts or not. However, the burden of proof in fraud cases, which are
neither in law nor in equity, is unchanged-only a greater weight of the evidence need be
shown. See Rigot v. Bucci, 245 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1971).
300. 283 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1973).
301. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ewing, 151 Fla. 661, 10 So. 2d 316 (1942); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Lecks, 122 Fla. 127, 165 So. 50 (1936).
302. This jury instruction, dealing with preponderance of the evidence and burden of
proof, was published by the Florida Bar pursuant to the supreme court's opinion in In re
Standard Jury Instructions, 198 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1967).
303. FLA. STD. J. INSTR. 3.7.
304. 283 So. 2d at 39 (emphasis added).
305. Id. at 40.
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The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that an
instruction to the jury on issues not in the pleadings is proper if
there is sufficient material evidence in the record to support the
court's charge."° This appears to be a corollary to the proposition
that pleadings may be amended to conform to evidence as presented
at trial.'" 7
Several standard jury instructions were amended on January
21, 1974, to conform with changes in the statutes or common law
upon which the instructions were based." 8
XIII. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL AND REHEARING
A new trial may be granted on grounds that damages are legally
inadequate0 9 or excessive."" When damages are excessive a trial
judge cannot reduce a verdict by remittitur without giving a plain-
tiff the option of a new trial."' Another basis for granting a new trial
is newly discovered evidence which, if introduced at trial, would
have a substantial likelihood of changing the result."2 In addition,
although failure to object, prior to the discharge of the jury, to a
verdict which was inconsistent and unsupported by the law or the
facts precludes raising such issue on appeal, such failure does not
preclude the trial court from granting a new trial pursuant to rule
1.530(d).313
Rule 1.530(b) requires that a motion for a new trial be served
within ten days of the rendition of the verdict in a jury action or the
306. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nall, 302 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974) (sufficient
evidence from medical witnesses existed in the record to support an instruction on aggrava-
tion of a pre-existing condition).
307. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(b).
308. E.g. FLA. STD. J. INSTrS. 3.2(e) (the preliminary charge on the guest statute was
deleted as the statute had been repealed); 5.2 (deletion of charge on doctrine of last clear
chance); 6.3-.13 (to conform to the revisions as to damages recoverable under the new Florida
Wrongful Death Act).
309. Thompson v. Fields, 292 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
310. Osteen v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 305 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
311. Dura Corp. v. Wallace, 297 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
312. In re Estate of Ira C. Hill, 294 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
313. Shank v. Fassoulas, 304 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). But see Gordon v. St.
Mary's Hosp., Inc., 305 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 4th Dist, 1974). At the conference on jury charges in
Gordon, both counsel agreed to a charge of last clear chance. Rule 1.470(b) provides that
failure to object to a charge constitutes waiver of assigning it as error. It was therefore error
to grant a new trial on the ground of the jury charge. Shank cannot be properly distinguished
on the basis that in that case the new trial was granted by the court's own motion pursuant
to rule 1.530(d). That rule specifically limits a court's power to those reasons "for which it
might have granted a rehearing or a new trial on motion of a party." Thus, there is a conflict
between the Third and Fourth Districts.
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entry of judgment in a non-jury action. In Lehmann v. Cloniger,14
the defendant served his motion for a new trial 29 days after the jury
verdict315 but only five days after the plaintiff's motion to assess
costs and enter a final judgment. The District Court of Appeal, First
District, held that the defendant's motion was within ten days of the
"rendition of the verdict" as rule 1.530(b) requires. To reach this
result the court had to construe Florida Appellate Rule 1.3 in pari
materia with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530. Appellate Rule
1.3 states that rendition of a judgment, decision, order or decree
occurs only after post-trial motions as permitted by the rules are
disposed of. Thus, when plaintiff's motion to assess costs was dis-
posed of, the verdict was "rendered" and the defendant's motion
within five days thereof was timely." '
This decision, with its convoluted reasoning, is objectionable
because it may cause different results in the same type of situations
under rule 1.530. The rule is clear-a party has ten days after the
rendition of the verdict to file his motion. But by disregarding this
plain meaning, the court has created uncertainty as to the time
element for filing the motion because once a post-trial motion is
filed, a party will have ten days after it is disposed of to move for a
new trial. Thus, the time when the post-trial motion is disposed of,
not the time when the verdict is rendered, becomes the determining
factor. One wonders whether a dilatory party can, by filing a post-
trial motion, give himself another extended opportunity to move
for a new trial. Such rationale is within the context of the court's
decision.317
Kilburn v. Davenport"8 involved a suit by an employee against
314. 294 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
315. The verdict was directed by the court as to compensatory damages and the jury
awarded $100,000 in punitive damages. This verdict was filed and recorded on the day it was
rendered. Id. at 345.
316. Appeals from motions granting new trials are governed by Florida Appellate Rule
4.2. It provides that "[a]ppeals may be prosecuted ... from interlocutory orders. . . except
those relating to motions for new trial .... " However, in 1971, Florida Statute section 59.04
(1973) was passed which allows appeals from motions granted for a new trial without waiting
for final judgment. This apparent conflict was resolved by the Supreme Court of Florida in
Clement v. Aztec Sales, Inc., 297 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1974). The court held that
an order granting a new trial is a substantive right given by statute and is not
interlocutory in nature so that an appeal therefrom may be made without conflict-
ing with Appellate Rule 4.2.
317. The court also stated that even if its rationale was not correct, it could construe
the word "judgment" in rule 1.530(b) as encompassing directed verdicts because as such they
are "more akin to a non-jury action" and therefore the "ten days from judgment" requirement
was met. 294 So. 2d at 347.
318. 286 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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his former employer for malicious prosecution. The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant moved for a directed verdict
and in the alternative for a new trial. The court granted the former
but failed to rule on the latter. The Third District reversed the
directed verdict and noted that in Florida a motion for a directed
verdict, when joined with a motion in the alternative for a new trial,
should be ruled upon in its entirety. This procedure eliminates sepa-
rate appeals from the individual motions. The trial court was or-
dered to rule on the new trial motion on remand.
XIV. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
Rule 1.540(b) sets forth five specific reasons for granting a mo-
tion to vacate a judgment. Federal rule 60(b), from which its Florida
counterpart 1.540(b) is derived, provides a sixth reason-"any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." It ap-
pears that Florida courts have by judicial decision adopted this
sixth reason as part of rule 1.540(b). In Smith v. Garst,'" a hearing
was held on the petitioner's competency. The court stated during
these proceedings that it would rule eventually on the petitioner's
status; yet, sixteen months later when the petitioner's brother in-
quired as to the status of the case, the court replied that the ruling
would be entered but did not specify when or how it would rule.
Subsequently, the petitioner was ruled incompetent and the court
notified the attorney who represented him at the original hearing.
However, that attorney informed the court that he no longer repre-
sented the petitioner. No further notice was given. About three
months later, after the time for appeal had expired, petitioner's
brother for the first time became aware of the ruling. The Second
District held, that under the described circumstances, an order to
vacate the adjudication of incompetency was proper so that the
petitioner could take an appeal.2 0
Relief may be granted parties from a judgment on grounds of
mistake. Rule 1.540(a) allows correction of clerical mistakes and
rule 1.540(b) allows correction of mistakes such as mutual mistakes
between the parties. In Hutchison v. Wintrode32' the plaintiff won
a suit for specific performance of a real property contract. At the
conclusion of the trial, both parties stipulated as to the legal
319. 289 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
320. Id. at 776. In another case not falling within the specific definitions of rule 1.540(b),
it was proper to vacate a default judgment entered upon issues settled in a prior case.
Silverman v. Lichtman, 285 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
321. 286 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
[Vol. XXX
CIVIL PROCEDURE
description of the property. The final judgment described the prop-
erty as stipulated. Upon affirmance of the judgment by the Second
District, a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed by the defendant
to the supreme court, which was pending at the time of the instant
case. In the interim, the plaintiff was granted a rule 1.540 motion
for relief from the judgment to correct the legal description of the
property, but the motion, although alleging mutual mistake or cleri-
cal error, did not specify upon which subsection of rule 1.540 it was
based. On appeal, the Second District reversed.
The order could not have been based on subsection (a) of the
rule; this subsection "relates to clerical mistakes arising from over-
sight or omission" such as "misnomers or misdescriptions of the
parties."3"' Yet in this case, since the description sought by the
plaintiff did not conform to the complaint or the contract, any mod-
ification of the judgment would have modified the terms of the
contract, which was substantive mistake. Subsection (b) would not
apply, if this were a mutual mistake, as this subsection did not
provide for making a correction during pendency of appeal, unlike
subsection (a). Thus, the lower court lost jurisdiction to entertain a
subsection (b) order once an appeal from the final judgment had
been filed.323
Kuykendall v. Kuykendall"4 also involved the issue of mistake.
The husband's counsel, in a dissolution of marriage proceeding,
mistakenly believed that, after jointly held property was partitioned
and judgment was entered thereon, his client could assert ownership
of the whole. As a result he consented to the inclusion of such a
partition in the final judgment. On counsel's assertion of this mis-
take, the trial court vacated a final judgment ordering the property
to be held as a tenancy in common. However, the First District
reversed, and held that a mistaken view of the law is not a circum-
stance of mistake contemplated by rule 1.540(b).2 5
Rule 1.540(b) also allows a judgment to be vacated if excusable
neglect was the cause of the adverse judgment. In one case, the
plaintiff failed to appear for a deposition for the fourth time, the last
of which was scheduled by court order. The plaintiff's complaint
was dismissed with prejudice, and he moved to vacate on the
322. Id. at 232, citing Danner v. Danner, 206 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
323. Id. at 233.
324. 301 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
325. The court noted that the husband had sufficient opportunity before final judgment
was entered to ascertain the law of Florida in regard to distribution of property upon dissolu-
tion. Id. at 467.
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grounds that the failures to appear for deposition were the result of
his counsel either being out of state on vacation, at trial in another
case, or in the hospital for surgery. The trial judge granted the
motion to vacate and defendant appealed. The Third District held
that, although the grounds may have been marginal in substance,
granting the motion was not an abuse of the trial judge's discretion
and affirmed the granting of plaintiff's motion to vacate on grounds
of excusable neglect.32 6 In Scott v. Seabreeze Pools, Inc. ,327 the plain-
tiff claimed excusable neglect for his failure to appear at trial to
prosecute. It appears that five days prior to trial, plaintiff's counsel
was granted a motion to withdraw from the case because he had not
been paid. Plaintiff had notice of the motion but did not attend the
hearing. Instead, he flew to Las Vegas and did not return until five
days after the trial date and the dismissal of his case with prejudice.
His motion for relief from judgment was denied by the trial court
and affirmed by the Fourth District. No inadvertence or excusable
neglect had been shown to justify relief.
If a judgment or decree is entered by a court without jurisdic-
tion, a motion to vacate will be granted. 38 Also a rule 1.540(b)
motion will be granted if newly discovered evidence is presented.2
However, when this evidence would not change the original result
if a new trial were granted, the motion will be denied.3  Another
limitation on the newly found evidence rule is that the motion must
be made within one year of the judgment.3 31 However, in one case,
the last sentence of rule 1.540(b), which provides that a court may
entertain an independent action to vacate a judgment for fraud
upon the court, was interpreted by the majority opinion as a possi-
ble way of circumventing the one year provision . 3 As a result, the
First District reversed the trial court's granting defendant's motion
to dismiss with prejudice of a tardy complaint to re-open an action.
Although not inferring that fraud upon the court could be alleged
or proven by the plaintiff, the court ordered, "in the interest of
326. Gillett v. Callaway, 289 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974); see Oxford Consumer
Discount Co. v. Adler, 296 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
327. 300 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
328. Murphy v. Shoemaker, 287 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). This case was docketed
in a court of record which was subsequently abolished due to revision of article V of the
Florida Constitution, effective January 1, 1973. The claim for $1642 was transferred to a
circuit court with a minimal jurisdictional amount of $2500. Since the circuit court was
without jurisdiction, the rule 1.540(b) motion was properly granted.
329. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b).
330. Milgen Devel., Inc. v. Goodman, 302 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
331. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b).
332. Potter v. Potter, 293 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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justice, under the facts alleged in this case," that the plaintiff be
permitted to file an amended complaint alleging fraud upon the
courts.333
A motion to vacate final judgment on the basis of newly discov-
ered evidence was also at issue in a quiet title action during the
survey period. Defendants charged that a final judgment was pro-
cured by fraud through the use of an alleged warranty deed which
was two separate instruments taped together. The Third District
held these allegations as a serious enough charge to warrant re-
manding the case for further discovery concerning the alleged wrong
and a new evidentiary hearing on a rule 1.540(b) motion to vacate. 34
In Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Pickard,315 appellees recovered a two
million dollar judgment against the appellants in a jury trial. The
judgment was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict. Subsequently, the appellant moved for an order to stay execu-
tion on the grounds that newly discovered evidence would affect the
case materially. The evidence was a fabricated check which was the
focus of alleged perjured testimony by the appellee. There had been
two trials in the case. The first, in which the alleged fraudulent
evidence was introduced, had resulted in a mistrial. In the second
trial, at which the judgment was awarded, the check had not been
entered into evidence because the falsity of the evidence had be-
come known to appellees' counsel approximately one week before
the trial. Appellant contended that "it became incumbent upon
[appellees'] counsel to divulge this information to the court and to
the appellants. '36 The Third District held that fraud was not dem-
onstrated, even though the information as to the falsity of the check
was not divulged to the court, and therefore denied the rule 1.540(b)
motion to vacate.
In Kern v. Kern,337 sufficient fraudulent misrepresentation was
demonstrated to vacate a judgment. The proceeding was one for
dissolution of marriage. The wife relied on the husband's represen-
tations as to the issue of child custody and allowed a default to be
entered against herself. The husband however had misled her and
the court granted her motion to vacate.
333. Id. at 719.
334. Pelekis v. Florida Keys Boys Club, 302 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); accord,
Pender v. Hatcher, 303 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
335. 289 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
336. Id. at 781-82.
337. 291 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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